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Abstract
Essays on Game and Economic Theory
Xiangliang Li
2021
This dissertation studies a range of topics in game and economic theory.
Chapter 1 proposes a new solution to the two-player bargaining problem of Nash (1950):
The Consensus solution. The Consensus solution maximizes the total amount of options
that both players agree are worse than the solution but better than no-cooperation. It
can be characterized by a simple equality. It satisfies all the axioms of the Nash solution
except Axiom IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives); the Nash solution satisfies all
its axioms except one, which says: when both players’ utilities of no-cooperation become
lower creating additional room for players to cooperate, then as long as options within the
additional room are worse than the current solution, the solution shall not change. At the
same time, it is the same as the Nash solution in comprehensive bargaining problems, a class
of bargaining problems where many good properties of the Nash solution are discovered.
We discuss when bargaining problems are non-comprehensive. We conclude that the key
difference between the two solutions is that the Consensus solution emphasize what players
can achieve via cooperation whereas the Nash solution focus more on the anticipation of
no-cooperation.
Chapter 2, coauthored with with Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis, studies a broad class
of network models where a large number of heterogeneous agents simultaneously interact
in many ways. We provide an iterative algorithm for calculating an equilibrium and offer
sufficient and “globally necessary” conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. The
results arise from a multi-dimensional extension of the contraction mapping theorem which
allows for the separate treatment of the different types of interactions. We illustrate that
a wide variety of heterogeneous agent economies – characterized by spatial, production, or
social networks – yield equilibrium representations amenable to our theorem’s characterization.
Chapter 3, coauthored with with Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis, develops a quantitative
general equilibrium model that incorporates the many economic interactions that occur over
the city, including commuting and spatial spillovers of productivities. Despite the many
spatial linkages, the model allows for characterizing the existence of the spatial equilibrium
of the city even when the spillovers are much more general than what are usually considered
in literature. We consider a city planner who designs zoning policies but leave the rest to the
market. The goal of the city planner is chosen such that the planner’s difference compared
with the market does not lie in redistribution but only efficiency. We provide an explicit
formula to evaluate welfare effects of zoning policies.
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Chapter 1
The Consensus Bargaining Solution
1
1.1 Introduction
Bargaining is a universal phenomenon arising from different economic problems e.g. allocation
of resources, exchange of goods, and coordination of actions. In these problems, bargaining
is only the phenomenon; behind it is the fundamental question of cooperation: there are
many ways of cooperating, different players favor different ways, which way shall be chosen?
Economists had long thought the answer arbitrary (e.g., Edgeworth, 1881, p. 29) until Nash
(1950).
Nash (1950) proposes to identify a solution by a list of its desired properties (axioms)
and implements the axiomatic approach within a simple bargaining model.
Definition 1. A two-player bargaining problem is a pair (W, s) where W ⊂ R2 is the set of
utilities that players 1 and 2 can obtain via cooperation and s ∈ R2 is the pair of utilities
obtained with no-cooperation and is usually called as the threat.
Within this bargaining problem, the solution example that Nash (1950) sets is the v ∈ W
that maximizes (v1 − s1)(v2 − s2) and the Nash solution can be identified by four axioms.
Nash (1950)’s impacts are fundamental. First, there is a clear before-and-after. Afterwards,
instead of regarding bargaining as indeterminate, economists have turned to find solutions
and there have been many alternatives (for surveys, see Roth, 1979; Peters, 1992; Thomson,
1994). Second, despite the fact that there are many solutions, the Nash solution has remained
the only one that is overwhelmingly used in applications. And these applications span almost
all subfields of economics: macroeconomics (e.g., Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Pissarides,
2000), industrial organziation (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Tirole, 1988; Hart, 1995),
political economy (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 2001), labor
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economics (e.g., Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori, 1992),
and so on. And many of them have become classic works in their own fields.
Except for its self-evident simplicity, the wide applications of the Nash solution can be
explained by its many appealing properties that people have found over the years. For
example, Harsanyi (1956) finds it coincides with Zeuthen’s solution (see Zeuthen), which
is an equilibrium point in a psychological bargaining process where players’ firmness is
measured by their evaluation of risk; Sobel (1981) and Moulin (1983) show that it satisfies the
property of midpoint domination; 1 Binmore (1984) shows that the Nash solution is closed
under the multiplication defined between bargaining problems; Lensberg (1988) shows that
the Nash solution is invariant in subproblems, which are obtained by fixing some players’
utilities; Maschler et al. (1988) shows that the Nash solution is the solution of a dynamic
system; Shapley (1988) points out that the Nash solution is the only solution such that,
under some scaling transformation for individual utilities, the outcome is both egalitarian
and utilitarian; Chun (1988); Peters and Van Damme (1991); Anbarci and Sun (2013) show
that the Nash solution is invariant when threat s and/or feasible set W are changed in
certain ways; last but not the least Van Damme (1986); Binmore et al. (1986); Howard
(1992); Trockel (2002) show that the Nash solution is the Nash equilibrium of some non-
cooperative bargaining games.
Despite its many appealing properties, the Nash solution has also been controversial.
First, its objective function, the product of two utility numbers (v1 − s1)(v2 − s2), does
not have a straightforward interpretation (Rubinstein et al., 1992); Second, Axiom IIA




(Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives) of the Nash solution says that suppose v is the
solution, if we remove some other options, v should remain to be the solution. While Axiom
IIA suggests that there is some intrinsic reason such that v is selected as the solution, its
implications are disturbing. Mathematically, the Nash solution only depends on v’s local
property; economically, it implies for the purpose of comparing two solution candidates, all
other options do not matter. Luce and Raiffa (1965) offer more detailed criticisms on Axiom
IIA. Last, we would like like to add that there are examples where the Nash solution clearly
clashes with our common sense. Consider the following one.
Example 1. Hulk and Betty negotiate how often they go hiking, biking, or do nothing.
And their utilities are u = fhuh + f bub + fnun where uh, ub, un ∈ R2, and fh, f b, fn ≥ 0
satisfying fh + f b + fn = 1 represent the frequencies of each activity. If they cannot reach
an agreement, they simply do nothing and get utilities un. In terms of Nash’s bargaining
model, the feasible set of utilities W is the triangle area of uh, ub, and un and the threat s
is un.
Consider an instance where uh = (2, 2), ub = (1, 3) (Hulk’s is 1 and Betty’s is 3), and
un = (0, 0), as shown in Figure 1.1a. That is Hulk prefers hiking and Betty prefers biking.
In this bargaining problem, the Nash solution is uh i.e. Hulk and Betty should always go
hiking. It is worth to point out that this is irrelevant with the fact that hiking gives the
same the same utility. For example, even if uh = (6, 2) and ub = (3, 3) as shown in Figure
1.1b, the Nash solution is still uh. In both cases, the Nash solution completely favors one
player over the other. There is no compromise at all clashing with our common sense.
Despite the controversies of the Nash solution, it has gained more consensus in literature
4
Figure 1.1: Hiking v.s. Biking
than other solutions and is the the main focus of bargaining theory and applications. By
no means this implies that other solutions, including the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
(Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), the continuous Raffia solution (Raiffa, 1953;
Livne, 1989; Peters and Van Damme, 1991), the Equal Area solution (Dekel, 1982; Ritz, 1985;
Anbarci and Bigelow, 1994), and the Supper-Additive solution (Perles and Maschler, 1981),2
are less convincing than the Nash solution. In fact, in our view, they all are intuitively
appealing. For example, the axiom of the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky that is employed to
replace Axiom IIA of the Nash solution says this: given every feasible utility of one player,
if the maximum feasible utility of the other player becomes weakly larger, then the utility
of the other player given by the solution should also weakly larger. However, one one hand,
these solutions are quite different from the Nash solution, which is reflected by the fact
that their key axioms are very different from Axiom IIA. As a result, it is not clear how
to precisely compare them and further make a trade-off. On the other hand, due to the
fundamental contribution of Nash (1950) and its simplicity, the Nash solution has magnetic-
2. Bargaining solutions can be classified into two types depending on if there are interpersonal comparison
of utilities. In the main context, we do not list solutions that impose interpersonal comparison of utilities
e.g. Utilitarian solution and Egalitarian solution.
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likely attracted much attention, which has led to discoveries of its many appealing properties;
and these discoveries in turn further reinforce the Nash solution’s attraction. To advance
our understanding of bargaining, it seems necessary to have a solution that can guide us out
of the Nash solution’s magnetic force, a solution that can be precisely compared with the
Nash solution and help us make a trade-off.
One mission of this paper is to provide such a new solution: the Consensus solution. The
Consensus solution achieves this mission by delicately being different but not too different
from the Nash solution.
On one hand, the Consensus solution is different from the Nash solution such that it
can overcome the Nash solution’s major controversies. First, it maximizes the total amount
of options that both players agree are worse than the solution but better than no-cooperation
(Problem 1.1). Therefore, it bears a straightforward interpretation of maximizing the consensus
of players. Second, it satisfies all the axioms of the Nash solution except the controversial
Axiom IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives); in contrast, the Nash solution satisfies
all its axioms except one (Axiom 6) which says: when both players’ utilities of no-cooperation
become lower creating additional room for players to cooperate, then as long as the options in
the additional room are worse than the current solution, the solution shall not change. Third,
the Consensus solution is not as extreme as the Nash solution in bargaining problems like
the one between Betty and Hulk because it can additionally capture the cooperative aspects
of a bargaining problem: although Betty and Hulk have a conflicting interest between biking
and hiking, they both are better off doing something instead nothing.
On the other hand, the Consensus solution is closely related with the Nash solution
such that it can inherit the appealing properties of the Nash solution. In terms of axioms,
6
it satisfies not only all the axioms of the Nash solution except Axiom IIA but also part
of Axiom IIA in the following sense. Specifically, we decompose Axiom IIA into several
subaxioms (Axioms 4, 5, and 6N). Among them, there is only one axiom (Axiom 6N) that
the Consensus solution does not satisfy. The rest axioms are enough to characterize the Nash
solution in comprehensive bargaining problems (Theorem 2c), 3 where most of the appealing
properties of the Nash solution are discovered. Since the Consensus solution also satisfies
the rest axioms, it is the same as the Nash solution in comprehensive bargaining problems
and correspondingly inherit these appealing properties of the Nash solution.
The bargaining theory after Nash (1950) gradually focuses on comprehensive bargaining
problems due to the idea of free disposal of utilities. Specifically, by free disposing players’
utilities, one can always transform a non-comprehensive bargaining problem into a comprehensive
one. At first glance, it appears a reasonable idea but careful investigations are needed
to reach a conclusion. In Nash’s bargaining model, utilities are only representations of
players’ preferences. They do not exist therefore cannot be directly free disposed. Although
physical resources can be freely disposed, it does not necessarily mean that utilities can




+x2 where x1 and x2 represent how much resources they get. Here, free disposing x1
decreases both players utility. Furthermore, the bargaining matter may not even be about
resources (see Example 1). Of course, one can assume that, on top of the bargaining matter,
there are physical resources that can independently affect players’ utilities. But on one
hand, one essentially consider another bargaining problem instead of what we are originally
3. A bargaining problem (W, s) is comprehensive if for any v ∈W and w ∈ R2, s ≤ w ≤ v implies w ∈W .
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interested in; on the other hand, this assumption may be invalid because there are bargaining
situations where there do not exist additional physical resources. We give detailed examples
in section 1.2.3.
While the Consensus solution inherits the appealing properties of the Nash solution and
overcomes some of its controversies, by no means we regard the Consensus solution as ideal.
It still bears some of the criticisms on Axiom IIA (mainly due to Axiom 5). But completely
discarding Axiom IIA would be a too big step and have the risk of adding confusions on top
of those we already have in bargaining theory. We would like to progressively move forward
and the Consensus solution can serve as a stepstone along the way. Therefore, in this paper
we propose the Consensus solution and compare it with the Nash solution; in our companion
paper, we propose another solution and compare it with the Consensus solution.
Now we shall move to the main context and formally introduce the Consensus solution.
1.2 Maximization
We consider the same bargaining problem (W, s) (see above Definition 1) as in Nash (1950)
and maintain the same assumptions: W is compact and convex and s ∈ W . Compactness is
a technical assumption. In the context of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, the availability
of randomization is sufficient for convexity. In Nash (1950), s ∈ W is assumed because s can
be obtained by two players jointly triggering the threat.
Before moving on, we need a few notations.
• v ≥ w if v1 ≥ w1, v2 ≥ w2;
• v  w if v ≥ w and v 6= w;
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• v ∈ W is an efficient point of W if there is no other w ∈ W such that w  v and we
denote the set of all efficient points as E(W );
• µ(W ) is the area of set W .
1.2.1 The Consensus Solution




µ({w ∈ W |s ≤ w ≤ v}). (1.1)
To interpret problem (1.1), consider all the points within W . Using threat s, we can
classify them into two types: Individually Irrational points I(W, s) ≡ {w ∈ W |w1 <
s1 or w2 < s2} and Individually Rational points R(W, s) ≡ {w ∈ W |w ≥ s}. The former
are, for at least one player, strictly worse than s and in problem (1.1), they do not matter in
any way. Given a solution candidate v ∈ E(W ), the latter can be classified into three types
as shown in Figure 1.2a: C(W, s, v) ≡ {w ∈ W |w ≤ v} ∩ R(W, s), Consensus points of v;
B1(W, s, v) ≡ {w ∈ W |w1 > v1, w2 ≤ v2} ∩ R(W, s), player 1’s Bargaining points of v; and
B2(W, s, v) ≡ {w ∈ W |w1 ≤ v1, w2 > v2} ∩R(W, s), player 2’s Bargaining points of v.
C(W, s, v) contains all options which, both players agree, are better than s but worse
than v. It is exactly {w ∈ W |s ≤ w ≤ v}, the measure of which problem (1.1) maximizes.
Thus, the Consensus solution of (W, s) can be interpreted as maximizing players’ consensus.
B1(W, s, v) and B2(W, s, v) are alternatives that are for one player strictly better than v
but worse for the other. Particularly, B1(W, s, v) contains options that player 1 prefers to v.
9
Figure 1.2: Notations
The larger it is, the lower v1, the more dissatisfied player 1 is with v. Similarly, B2(W, s, v)
can measure player 2’s dissatisfaction. the Consensus solution can also be interpreted as
minimizing players’ total dissatisfaction. To see this, notice that µ(C(W, s, v)) = µ(R(W, s))−
µ(B1(W, s, v))− µ(B2(W, s, v)). Thus, problem (1.1) is equivalent to
min
v≥s,v∈E(W )
µ(B1(W, s, v)) + µ(B2(W, s, v)). (1
min)
1.2.2 Characterization
Now we provide the characterization results of the Consensus solution.
Theorem 1. Suppose W is convex and compact and s ∈ W .
(a). There exists a unique solution of problem (1.1).
(b). If there is only a unique efficient point in (W, s) that is individually rational, i.e.
E(R(W, s)) is a singleton, the solution of problem (1.1) is E(R(W, s)); if E(R(W, s)) is not
a singleton, v is a solution of problem (1.1) if and only if there exists a outward normal
10







where, as shown in Figure 1.2b, point v1 is the other intersection of the boundary of R(W, s)
and the vertical line passing v and similarly v2 is the other intersection of the boundary of
R(W, s) and the horizontal line passing v. Moreover, |vv1|, |vv2| > 0.
Theorem 1 is foundational to this paper. It not only gives the characterization results of
the Consensus solution but also is important to discover and prove the axiomatic characterization
in next section.
In Theorem 1, equation (1.2) is essentially the first order condition of problem (1.1).
This equation can also be stated geometrically as: line v1v2 and supporting line T that
corresponds to normal vector n are in parallel.
To prove Theorem 1, we rewrite problem (1.1) as maxv∈E(R(W,s)) µ({w ∈ R(W, s)|w ≤
v}). Clearly, we just need to show the case where E(R(W, s)) is not a singleton. For this
case, R(W, s) must be full-dimensional i.e. µ(R(W, s)) > 0. Therefore, we can replace the
constraint v ∈ E(R(W, s)) with v ∈ R(W, s). Then it is convenient to consider a more
general problem as shown below.
max
v∈W
µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v}). (1.3)
Now we state the characterization results of problem (1.3) in below Lemmas 1-3. For the
purose of Theorem 1 (the part where E(R(W, s)) is not a singleton), we just need to apply
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them with set R(W, s).
Lemma 1. Existence: For any compact set W ⊂ R2, problem (1.3) has a solution.
Lemma 2. First Order Condition: Suppose W is convex, compact, and full dimensional
(µ(W ) > 0), and E(W ) is not a singleton. Then v is a solution of problem (1.3) if and
only if there exists a outward normal vector n = (n1, n2) of W at v such that equation (1.2)
holds. Moreover, |vv1|, |vv2| > 0 4 and µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v}) first weakly increases then weakly
decreases as v moves along E(W ) from left to right.
Before stating Lemma 3, we need to define a type of bargaining sets. Suppose W is
convex, compact, and full dimensional. If there exists a nontrivial interval I ⊂ E(W ) and a
line L parallel with I such that for any v ∈ I, its corresponding v1, v2 ∈ L, we then call such
W as an Odd Bargaining set. An example of an Odd Bargaining set is the convex hull of
points a = (2, 0), b = (2, 1), c = (1, 2), and d = (0, 2), where I is interval bc and L is line ad.
Lemma 3. Uniqueness: Suppose W is convex, compact, and full dimensional. Problem
(1.3) has multiple solutions if and only if W is an Odd Bargaining Set.
We leave the formal proofs of Lemmas 1-3 in Appendix 1.6.2 and sketch their intuitive
ideas here. For Lemma 1, we just need to show the objective function in problem is continuous
with respect to v and then the existence follows from Weierstrass’s extreme value theorem.
For Lemma 2, to show that v is a solution of problem (1.3) implies equation (1.2) holds,
we compare the area of {w ∈ W |w ≤ v′} with {w ∈ W |w ≤ v′} where v′ is an efficient
point right to v. As shown in Figure 1.3a, the increment and decrement are the areas of sets
4. v1, v2 are defined the same way in Theorem 1 but with respect to set W instead of R(W, s).
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v′v′1v1vx and vv2v′2vx respectively, where v′1 and v′2 are defined similarly as v1 and v2 and
vx is the intersection of intervals vv1 and v′v′2. Therefore, when v′ and v are close enough,






vector n at v. Thus we must have
µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v′})− µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v}) ≈ |v′1 − v1||vv1| − |v′2 − v2||vv2|






Therefore, v is a solution of problem (1.3) implies equation (1.2) equation (1.2) holds. To





weakly decreases as v moves
along E(W ) from left to right. The second term n1
n2
weakly increases because W is convex.
The firs term must weakly decrease since it is equal to the slope of line v1v2 and as shown
in Figure 1.3b, line v1v2 must be weakly steeper than line v′1v2 because v, v′1, v1, and v2
are extreme points of W , which in turn must be weakly steeper than line v′1v′2 for a similar
reason.
(a) Necessary Part. (b) Sufficiency Part.
Figure 1.3: Illustration of the Proof of Lemma 2.
For Lemma 2, ifW is an Odd Bargaining set, Lemma 2 immediately implies the corresponding
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interval I of W are solutions of problem (1.3); if problem (1.3) has multiple solutions, we show
W must be an Odd Bargaining set according to its definition i.e. there exists corresponding
interval I and line L, which we prove by respectively showing for different solution v, n1
n2
of
equation (1.2) has to be the same and |vv
1|
|vv2| also has to be the same. Appendix 1.6.3 contains
the details of this proof.
Applying Lemmas 1 and 2 with set R(W, s), we immediately get the existence and
equation (1.2) in Theorem 1. To get the uniqueness result in Theorem 1, according to
Lemma 3, we just need to show that R(W, s) is not an Odd Bargaining set, which has to be
true because s ≤ w for any point w ∈ R(W, s) but in an Odd Bargaining set, there cannot
exist such point s.
1.2.3 Comparison with the Nash solution
It is well-known that the Nash solution is the solution of the below problem
max
v≥s,v∈E(W )
(v1 − s1)(v2 − s2).
To contrast the Nash and Consensus solutions, we rewrite it as below, reprint problem (1.1),
and illustrate them in Figure 1.4:
max
v≥s,v∈E(W )
µ({w ∈ R2|s ≤ w ≤ v}); (1N)
max
v≥s,v∈E(W )
µ({w ∈ W |s ≤ w ≤ v}). (1)
For problem (1N), we have the following theorem.
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Figure 1.4: The areas that the Nash and Consensus solutions maximize.
Theorem 1N. 5 Suppose s ∈ W and W is convex and compact.
(a). There exists a unique solution of problem (1N).
(b). If there is only a unique efficient point in (W, s) that is individually rational, i.e.
E(R(W, s)) is a singleton, the solution of problem (1.1) is E(R(W, s)); if E(R(W, s)) is not
a singleton, v is a solution of problem (1.1) if and only if there exists a outward normal







where points a1 ≡ (v1, s2) and a2 ≡ (s1, v2).
Equations (1N) and (1) suggest that for the Consensus solution, its desirability solely
depends on the options within W whereas for the Nash solution, it may depend on options
outside W . Such difference in dependence on W is again revealed in their characterizing
equations (1.2) and (2N). The two equations’ right sides are exactly the same and about the
local information of W at v; their left sides are different. The left side of equation (1.2), it




|vv2| depending on points (v
1 and v2) in W whereas the left side of equation (2N) is |va
1|
|va2|
where a1 and a2 may be outside of W .
Now we revisit Example 1 we introduce in last section. With the help of equation (1.2),




). In terms of physical actions, the Consensus
solutions means that they go biking 40% of the time and go hiking 60% of the time, which
is much more moderate than Nash solution.
Despite their difference, the two solutions are the same in comprehensive bargaining
problems. To see this, notice that for a comprehensive bargaining problem (W, s), all points
w satisfying s ≤ w ≤ v are within W . Therefore, equations (1N) and (1) coincide thus the
two solutions must be the same.
In literature, comprehensive bargaining problems are widely studied because of the idea
that one can always transform a non-comprehensive bargaining problem into a comprehensive
one by independently free disposing players’ utilities. This idea appears reasonable but
careful investigations are needed to reach a conclusion. First, in Nash’s bargaining model,
utilities are only representations of players’ preferences, they do not really exist and therefore
cannot be free disposed. Second, what may be free disposed are physical resources. However,
on one hand, the bargaining matter may not be about resources (see Examples 1 and 2a);
on the other hand, even when the bargaining matter is about resources, independently free
disposing players’ resources is neither sufficient nor necessary (Examples 2b and 2c). Last,
surely one can transform a non-comprehensive bargaining problem to a comprehensive one
by including from outside of the bargaining matter resources that can independently affect
players’ utilities. However, on one hand, since these resources have nothing to do with
the bargaining matter, it is questionable that such inclusion is the right description of real
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bargaining situations and what players would like to subscribe to; on the other hand, there
are situations where there are no outside resources to be included at all because all physical
resources have already been included (Examples 2d and 2e). Of course, sometimes we do
consider some form of free disposal like money burning (e.g. , Spence, 1978; Van Damme,
1989), but they are in strategic models with incomplete information where free disposal serves
as a signal or communication device and shall not be confused with Nash’s cooperative model
with complete information where bargaining is to argue cases that favor instead of oppose
their interests.
Example 2. (a). Coordination of Actions Two countries need to coordinate (e.g.
on climate change) which action to take from n options, under which their utilities are
u1, u2, ..., un ∈ R2. If they cannot agree which action to take, they get utilities u0. In terms
of Nash’s bargaining model, W is the convex hull of points u0, u1, ..., un and s is u0. Here
(W, s) is non-comprehensive unless u0 is correlated with other actions in a specific manner,
as shown in below,
u01 ≥ min
k∈A2





uk2 where A1 = argmax
k=1,2,...,n
uk1.
(b). Allocation of Resources Two brothers have 2 million dollars to inherit. Their
utilities are u1 = x1 and u2 =
x1
2
+ x2 where x1 and x2 represent how much money they
get. They need to agree how to split the money subject to x1 + x2 ≤ 2; otherwise, they get
nothing. W is the triangle area of points (0, 0), (0, 2) and (2, 1) and threat s is (0, 0). Here,
although we assume free disposal of money, (W, s) is not comprehensive.
(c). Exchange of Goods Two players derive their utilities from consuming two goods:
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where xA1 and x
B
1 stands for player 1’s consumption of apple and banana; similar for x
A
2 and
xB2 . Denote their total endowments of the goods are (3, 3). Following the standard setup in
Edgeworth’s box, xA1 + x
A




2 = 3. In terms of Nash’s bargaining model, W is
the quadrilateral (0, 9), (6, 6), (9, 0), and (3, 3), s is their utilities before the exchange. Notice
that although we do not assume free disposal of goods, (W, s) is comprehensive regardless
the position of threat s.
(d). Wage Negotiation Labor union and management negotiate how to split 1 unit
profits. Their utilities are respectively uL = w and uM = 1 − w where w ≥ 0 represents
the wage. If no agreement, an strike happens, labor union gets nothing and management
suffers 1 loss due to fixed cost i.e. uL = 0. In terms of Nash’s bargaining model, W is
the triangle (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0,−1) (the first coordinate represent union’s utility) and s is
(0,−1). (W, s) is non-comprehensive. And the Nash solution sets w = 1.
(e). Marriage Problem Two partners are married. Their utilities are u1 = c1 +
l1 and u2 = c2 + l2 where c1, c2 ≥ 0 represent their consumption satisfying c1 + c2 ≤ a
(a > 0 is their total asset), and l1, l2 ≥ 0 represent the enjoyment that they obtain from
the accompanionship. They need to decide how to allocate their consumption. If they
cannot reach an agreement, divorce happens and their consumption is (a1, a2) dictated by
law satisfying a1 + a2 = a. Triangle M of points (l1, l2 + a), (l1 + a, l2), and (l1, l2) represents
what utilities they can obtain within marriage. In terms of Nash’s bargaining model, W
is the convex hull formed by triangle M and point (a1, a2), and s is (a1, a2). (W, s) is
non-comprehensive if either l1 > a1 or l2 > a2 holds.
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1.3 Axiomatization
In above, we compare the Consensus and Compromise solutions within a single bargaining
problem. In this section, we view them as functions of all the bargaining problems and
compare the axioms that characterize them.
Let B be a set of tuples (W, s) where W ∈ R2 is convex and compact, and s is a point in
W . Consider function V : B→ R2. If for all (W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s) ∈ W , we then call V (·) as
a solution of bargaining problems.
In below, we present axioms that lead to the Consensus and Nash solutions. The two
solutions share five axioms in common. This is connected with the result of last section—
the common axioms are enough to identify them in comprehensive bargaining problems.
Formally, we have the below theorem.
Theorem 2. (a). A solution V (·) of B satisfies Axioms 1-5, and 6 if and only if for any
(W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s) is the Consensus solution of (W, s) i.e. the solution of problem (1.1).
(b). A solution V (·) of B satisfies Axioms 1-5, and 6N if and only if for any (W, s) ∈ B,
V (W, s) is the Nash solution of (W, s) i.e. the solution of problem (1N).
(c). A solution V (·) of B satisfies Axioms 1-5 if and only if for any comprehensive
bargaining problem (W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s) is the Consensus (and Nash) solution of (W, s).
We introduce a few notations used in below axioms. We call a point w and a subset W
of R2 as symmetric if w1 = w2 and W = {(w2, w1)|w ∈ W}, respectively. For given points
c ∈ R2++, b ∈ R2, and w ∈ R2, c·w+b ≡ (c1w1+b1, c2w2+b2) and c·W+b ≡ {c·w+b|w ∈ W}.
Here (c, b) represents a pair of order-preserving affine transformations of players’ utilities.
And W \W ′ ≡ {w ∈ W |w /∈ W ′}.
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Axiom 1. Efficiency: For any (W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s) is an efficient point of W .
Axiom 2. Symmetry: For any (W, s) ∈ B, if both W and s are symmetric, then V (W, s)
is symmetric.
Axiom 3. Affine Invariance: For any (W, s) ∈ B, for any c ∈ R2++ and b ∈ R2, V (c ·
W + b, c · s+ b) = c · V (W, s) + b.
Axioms 1-3 are used in Nash (1950). Axiom 1 is self-evident. Axiom 2 says that V (·)
shall be impartial. The subtext of Axiom 3 is that utilities are only representations of
players’ preferences therefore different representations shall not change the solution, just like
one shall not feel colder if Celsius is used instead of Fahrenheit. Since the absolute values
of utilities become meaningless, Axiom 3 effectively rules out interpersonal comparison of
utilities.
Axiom 4. -Irrational: For any (W, s), (W ′, s) ∈ B, if W ⊃ W ′ and W \W ′ are Individually
Irrational points of V (W, s), then V (W ′, s) = V (W, s).
Axiom 5. -Bargaining: For any (W, s), (W ′, s) ∈ B, if W ⊃ W ′ and W \ W ′ are
Bargaining points of V (W, s), then V (W ′, s) = V (W, s).
Axiom 6. +Consensus: For any (W, s), (W, s′) ∈ B, if s′ ≤ s and R(W, s′) \ R(W, s) are
Consensus points of V (W, s), then V (W, s′) = V (W, s).
Axiom 6N. (a). -Consensus: For any (W, s), (W ′, s) ∈ B, if W \ W ′ are Consensus
points of V (W, s), then V (W ′, s) = V (W, s);
(b). Threat Reference: For any (W, s), (W, s′) ∈ B, if s′ ≤ s and s′ is on the same
line with s and V (W, s) 6= s, then V (W, s′) = V (W, s).
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Axioms 4, 5, and 6N can be seen as a decomposition of Axiom IIA used in Nash (1950).
Using the same notations, we can state Axiom IIA as: For any (W, s), (W ′, s) ∈ B, if W ′ ⊂ W
and V (W, s) ∈ W ′, then V (W ′, s) = V (W, s). Clearly, Axiom IIA implies the Axioms 4, 5,
6Na. But the reverse does not hold because the three axioms say independently removing
individually irrational points, V (W, s)’s Bargaining points, and V (W, s)’s Consensus points
does not change the solution while the contents of Axiom IIA are much richer than its
appearance and also covers cases of jointly removing them.
Figure 1.5: Subfigures (a), (b), and (c) are examples where Axiom 6 apply; Axiom 6 does not
apply in Subfigures (d) because s′ ≤ s does not hold; Axiom 6 does not apply in Subfigures (e)
because compared with R(W, s), R(W, s′) also has more (Player 2’s) Bargaining Points of v(shaded
area); in Subfigure (f), there does not exist s′ 6= s such that Axiom 6 can apply.
While Axioms 2-5 need further explanations, they have nothing to do with understanding
the differences between the Consensus and Nash solutions, the main mission of this paper.
Thus we leave these explanations to Section 1.5 and turn our main focus on Axioms 6 and
6N.
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Axiom 6 says that when the threat becomes worse for both players (s′ ≤ s), players
have additional options to cooperate ( R(W, s′) ⊃ R(W, s)), then as long as the additional
options are worse than the current solution (R(W, s′) \ R(W, s) are Consensus points), the
solution shall not change. Put it in short, Axiom 6 says the case when the change of the
threat induces more Consensus points regardless the exact position of the new threat. In
comparison, Axiom 6N is almost the exact opposite of Axiom 6. Axiom 6Na says cases of
lessening Consensus points ; Axiom 6Nb says cases when the threat changes and the new
threat is at a certain position: in the same line with the old threat and solution.
Now consider Axioms 6 and 6N in below examples.
Example 3. (a). Let s = (0, 0), a1 = (1, 0), a2 = (0, 2), and v = (1, 1) as shown in Figure
1.6a. Denote sa1va2 as W . Both the Nash and Consensus solutions of (W, s) are v.
Figure 1.6: Nash Solution v.s. Consensus Solution (The detailed description is Example 3.)
Denote triangle sva2 as W ′. Here W \W ′ are Consensus points of v. For (W ′, s), the Nash





thus violates Axiom 6Na.
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), as shown in
Figure 1.6b. Both the Nash and Consensus solutions of (W ′, s′) are v′.
Let s′′ be (0, 1
2
). s′′ is on line s′v′. For (W ′, s′′), the Nash solution is still v′ satisfying




) thus violates Axiom 6Nb.
(c). Let s = (0, 0), a1 = (3, 1), a2 = (1, 3), b1 = (−1,−3), b2 = (−3,−1) as shown in
Figure 1.6c. Denote rectangle a1a2b2b1 as W . Both the Nash and Consensus solutions of
(W, s) are v = (2, 2).
Consider (W, s1). Here R(W, s1)\R(W, s) are more Consensus points of v. The Consensus
solution is still v; but the Nash solution changes to a1 thus violates Axiom 6. Similarly in
(W, s2).
In our view, the above three examples together with Axioms 6 and 6N reflect what matter
more in determining the Consensus and Nash solutions. For the Consensus solution, what
two player can achieve via cooperation (Consensus and Bargaining points) matter more. In
Example 3a, the Consensus solution changes with lessening Consensus points; In Example
3b, the Consensus solution favors player 2 more in (W ′, s′′) than in (W ′, s′) with more player
2’s Bargaining points (of v′); In Example 3c, the Consensus solution does not change because
Bargaining points do not change and there are more Consensus points. For the Nash solution,
what two player can achieve via no-cooperation (the threat) matters more. In Examples 3a
and 3b, the Nash solution does not change because the relative position of the threat does
not change; in Example 3c, the Nash solution changes because the relative position of the
threat changes.
We will continue to discuss such difference between the Nash and Consensus solutions
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from other perspectives in next section. Before that, we present the proof of Theorem 2a.
Theorem 2b’s proof is very similar and can be found in Appendix 1.6.4.
Proof. If part: If for any (W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s) is the solution of problem (1.1), V (·) satisfies
Axioms 1 -5.
Axiom 1: V (·) clearly satisfies Axiom 1.
Axiom 2: Consider symmetric W and s. W ’s has a unique symmetric efficient point.
Denote it as v. We just need to show V (W, s) = v. That is to show that v is the solution
of problem (1.1). If E(R(W, s)) is a singleton, clearly v is the solution of problem (1.1). If
not, due to the symmetry of W , s and v, there exists a tangent line T of W at v with slope
−1 and v1v2’s slope is also −1. Thus equation (1.2) in Theorem 1 holds. Again, v is the
solution of problem (1.1).
Axiom 3: Under order preserving affine transformations on utilities, the relative positions
of points inW do not change. Specifically, if E(R(W, s)) is a singleton, after the transformation,
it is still a singleton; if E(R(W, s)) is not a singleton, the parallel relationship between lines
v1v2 and tangent line T does not change, that is equation (1.2) in Theorem 1 still holds. In
both cases, the relative positions of the solution of problem (1.1) do not change. Thus, V (·)
satisfies Axiom 3.
Axiom 4: V (·) clearly satisfies Axiom 4.
Axiom 5: Since W ′ is a subset of W , for any v′ ∈ E(W ′), we have
µ({w ∈ R(W, s)|w ≤ v′}) ≥ µ({w ∈ R(W ′, s)|w ≤ v′}).
Furthermore, since W \W ′ are Bargaining points of V (W, s), when v′ = V (W, s), two sides
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of the above inequality are equal. Thus, V (W, s) must also solve problem (1.1) with (W ′, s).
That is V (·) satisfies Axiom 5.
Axiom 6: Since R(W, s′) \ R(W, s) are Consensus Points of v ≡ V (W, s), we have
E(R(W, s′)) = E(R(W, s)) and µ({w ∈ R(W, s′)|w ≤ v}) = µ({w ∈ R(W, s)|w ≤ v}) +
µ(R(W, s′) \ R(W, s)). So v must also solve problem (1.1) with (W, s′). Thus V (·) satisfies
Axiom 6.
Only If part: If V (·) of B satisfies Axioms 1 - 6, for any (W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s) is the
solution of problem (1.1). Suppose v solves problem (1.1). We prove this part by showing
V (W, s) = v.
If E(R(W, s)) is a singleton, due to Axiom 1, we have V (R(W, s), s) = v. Also, due to
Axiom 4, we have V (W, s) = V (R(W, s), s). Thus V (W, s) = v.
If E(R(W, s)) is a not singleton, we prove V (W, s) = v in below six steps and they are
illustrated in Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7: Proof of Theorem 2
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(a) Since v solves problem (1.1), according to part (b) of Theorem 1, we have a supporting
line T at v such that T is parallel with v1v2.
(b) Due to Axiom 3, it is equivalent to prove V (W, s) = v after order-preserving affine
transformations on utilities. Implement affine transformations such that v becomes
a symmetric point and T ’s slope is −1. Line v1v2’s slope must also be −1. Thus
|vv1| = |vv2|. Let s′ ≡ (v21, v12). s′ must be symmetric.
Here we provide a few observations of s′ that will be used in later steps: (1). s′ ≤ v;
(2). s ≤ s′ because s ≤ v1 and s ≤ v2; (3). s′ ∈ W because s′ is within triangle
sv1v2 ⊂ W .
(c) Let W 1 be the triangle area circumvented by lines T , s′v1, and s′v2. W 1 must also be
symmetric. According to Axioms 1 and 2, V (W 1, s′) = v.
(d) Due to observation (3) in step b, R(W, s′) is well-defined. Denote it as W 2. Notice that
W 1 \W 2 contains only Bargaining points of v. According to Axiom 5, V (W 2, s′) =
V (W 1, s′) = v.
(e) Notice that for any W, s′, R(W, s′) = R(R(W, s′), s′) i.e. R(W, s′) = R(W 2, s′).
According to Axiom 4, V (W, s′) = V (W 2, s′) = v.
(f) We already have s ≤ s′ (observation (2) in step b). According to Axiom 6, V (W, s) =
V (W, s′) = v, as desired, if we can further show that R(W, s) \R(W, s′) are Consensus
points of v.
It is equivalent to show for any Bargaining point w ∈ R(W, s) of v, w ≥ s′ i.e. w1 ≥ s′1
and w2 ≥ s′2. Without loss of generality, suppose w is player 1’s Bargaining point of v.
26
Thus w1 > v1. Also v1 ≥ s′1(observation (1) in step b). So w1 > s′1. We prove w2 ≥ s′2
by contradiction. Suppose not, w2 < s
′
2. The locational relationship between v, s, w
and v1 are:
• v is strictly right above v1;
• s is weakly below and strictly left to v1;
• w is strictly below and right to v1 (w2 < s′2 = v12 and w1 > v1 = v11).
Thus v1 is an interior point of triangle vsw. A contradiction with v1 being an extreme
point of R(W, s).

1.4 Further Comparison
In last two sections, we have compared the Consensus and Nash solutions from perspectives
of maximization and axiomatization. In this section, we further compare them from other
perspectives.
1.4.1 Isosolution
As shown in Axioms 6 and 6N, one key difference between the Consensus and Nash solutions
lies in the position of the threat. To further explore the meaning of the position of the threat,
we consider all the possiblities of threat s within W . Formally, we introduce a new concept:
isosolution. An isosolution of v ∈ E(W ) is the set of threats that yield v as a solution in
(W, s).
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Consider the W in Example 3c. Let v be any point on interval a1a2. As shown in
Figure 1.8a, its Nash isosolution is an interval, the intersection of W and the line passing v
with slope 1, which reflects Axiom 6Na. Whereas, its Consensus isosolution depends on the
position of v, as shown in Figure 1.8a’. If v is above point (2, 2), its Consensus isosolution
is a polyline with two segments : the first segment’s slope is 1 the same with the Consensus
isosolution within triangle sa1a2; the second segment is horizontal. When the threat moves
from the first segment to the second segment, there are new individually rational points and
they all are Consensus points of v, which reflects Axiom 6. If v is below point (2, 2), it is
the same with the exception that the second segment is vertical. If v is point (2, 2), the
second segment becomes the whole pentagon b1s1ss2b2. In Figures 1.8b and 1.8b′, we also
show the Nash and Consensus isosolutions when W is a unit disk. As Figure 1.8 shown, the
Consensus and Nash solutions are the same when the threat is close to the efficient frontier
of W , specifically, when the threat is at the first segment of the Consensus isosolution and
the two solutions are usually different from each other when the threat is far away from the
efficient frontier. To understand this further, we move to next section.
1.4.2 Situation of Bargaining
Now, we compare the Consensus and Nash solutions through understanding the situation of
bargaining problem (W, s).
Situation of Bargaining Problem (W, s): W part Since W can be completely
characterized by its boundary δW , we can understand situation of W through δW . We need
to introduce four sets.
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Figure 1.8: Isosolution: the set of threats that yield the same solution.
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• M1 ≡ {w ∈ W |w1 = max
w′∈W,w′2=w2
w′1} are the best choices for player 1 given player 2’s
utilities;
• m1 ≡ {w ∈ W |w1 = min
w′∈W,w′2=w2
w′1} are the worst choices for player 1 given player 2’s
utilities;
• M2 ≡ {w ∈ W |w2 = max
w′∈W,w′1=w1
w′2} are the best choices for player 2 given player 1’s
utilities;
• m2 ≡ {w ∈ W |w2 = min
w′∈W,w′1=w1
w′2} are the worst choices for player 2 given player 1’s
utilities.
Now we can divide W ’s boundary into the below eight contiguous segments, as shown in
Figure 1.9.
• M1 ∩M2 represents “win-win” and is a downward-sloping curve;
• m1 ∩m2 represents “lose-lose” and is a downward-sloping curve;
• M1 ∩m2 represents “win-lose” and is a upward-sloping curve;
• m1 ∩M2 represents “lose-win” and is a upward-sloping curve;
• A1 ≡ argmaxw∈W w1 represents “Win–” and is a vertical line;
• a1 ≡ argminw∈W w1 represents “Lose–” and is a vertical line;
• A2 ≡ argmaxw∈W w2 represents “–Win” and is a horizontal line;
• a2 ≡ argminw∈W w2 represents “–Lose” and is a horizontal line;
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Figure 1.9: Situation of (W, s)
A1, a1, A2, and a2 describe the situation of W from one player’s perspective; M1 ∩M2,
m1 ∩ m2, M1 ∩ m2, and m1 ∩M2 are from two players’ perspectives. Specifically, A1 and
a1 are the best and worst choices for player 1; similarly, A2 and a2 are the best and worst
choices for player 2; M1∩M2 and m1∩m2 feature the non-cooperative aspects of W because
along them two players’ interests are negatively correlated; whereas, M1 ∩m2 and m1 ∩M2
feature the cooperative aspects of W because along them two players’ interests are positively
correlated.
Since M1∩M2, m1∩m2, M1∩m2, and m1∩M2 are from two players’ perspectives, among
the above eight sets, they are relatively more important in shape the situation. To better
see this, consider examples in Figure 1.10. In them, W is a rectangle with the center at the
origin and the slopes of its edges are −1 and 1. Denote the lengths of its edges along the
two directions as ln and lc. They represent the strengths of non-cooperative and cooperative
aspects of W . And Figures 1.10a-1.10c are examples where ln > lc, ln = lc, and ln < lc.
Clearly, players’ interests are relatively more conflicting in Figure 1.10a and more consistent
in Figure 1.10c. To be more precise, define a uniform probability over W , then correlation
coefficients of two players utilities in Figures 1.10a-1.10c are respectively smaller than, equal
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to, and bigger than 0. 6
Figure 1.10: Situation of W
(If we think of δW as a piece of music, the above eight sets are its basic notes. To hear
them, run your finger along δW in Figures 1.9 and 1.10.)
Situation of Bargaining Problem (W, s): s part Threat s reshapes the situation
by classifying some points in W as individually irrational or rational. We simply call
this classification as eliminating individually irrational points. To understand the reshaped
situation, again, we can focus on the boundary of W : which part of δW is eliminated by s?
Or equivalently, which part remains?
Depending on the exact position of s in W , different parts of δW can be eliminated. But
almost always, one whole non-cooperative segment, m1 ∩m2, is eliminated (except s itself
when s ∈ m1 ∩m2); always, part of the other non-cooperative segment, M1 ∩M2, remains;
oftentimes, parts of the cooperative segments, m1 ∩ M2 and M1 ∩ m2, remain; m1 ∩ M2
and M1 ∩ m2 are completely eliminated whenever the below two inequalities strictly hold










In next subsection, we use the above two inequalities to understand some bargaining
situations of some economic problems even without having to explicitly write down what
W and s are. We are able to do this because the two inequalities have straightforward
interpretations. Each one of them tests if the threat is empty or not for some player by
considering an extreme scenario. Suppose player 1 abstains from bargaining with player 2
except the right of triggering the threat. In W , clearly player 2 wants to choose from A2, but
will player 2 be able to freely choose without any concern? The answer is no if the first of
inequalities (1.4) holds, that is, player 1’s threat is not empty ; no if it does hold. Similarly,
the second inequality tests if player 2’s threat is empty or not.
The View from Situation of Bargaining Problem (W, s) Now we are ready
to understand the differences of the Nash and Consensus solutions from the perspective of
the situation of bargaining.
As shown in equation (2N), the Nash solution depends, except s, only on v; whereas, as
shown in equation (1.2), the Consensus solution, in addition, depends on v1 and v2. Here, v
is on M1 ∩M2; v1 and v2 may be on M1 ∩m2 and m1 ∩M2. Thus, the Nash solution only
consider a non-cooperative aspect of W ; whereas, the Consensus solution additionally uses
v1 and v2, to detect the cooperative aspects of W .
Whether the cooperative aspects of W are detected by v1 or v2 is a sharp characterization
of whether Consensus solution v is the Nash solution or not.
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For Consensus solution v, if its corresponding v1 or v2 is on M1 ∩m2 or m1 ∩M2, almost
always, v is not the Nash solution. In Figures 1.8a and 1.8b, it is such case when the
threat is outside of triangle a1sa2 i.e. the threat is on the second segment of a Consensus
isosolution. And as long as the threat is outside of triangle a1sa2 and or not on interval sb
where b = (−2,−2), v is not the Nash solution.
For Consensus solution v, if neither its corresponding v1 nor v2 is on M1∩m2 or m1∩M2,
v is also the Nash solution. In Figures 1.8a and 1.8b, when the threat is within triangle a1sa2
i.e. the threat is on the first segment of a Consensus isosolution. And as long as the threat
is inside triangle a1sa2, v is always the Nash solution. This can also be formally examined
by the following two equations 
I1(v) = v2 − s2;
I2(v) = v1 − s1.
(1.5)
If neither its corresponding v1 nor v2 is on M1 ∩m2 or m1 ∩M2, the above two equations
hold and according to equations (1.2) and (2N), v must also be the Nash solution.
Furthermore, we speak intuitively when the Nash and Consensus solutions are different
or the same from two perspectives: W and s. From the perspective of W : when the situation
of W is mainly non-cooperative, its cooperative aspects are less likely to be detected and the
Nash and Consensus solutions are less likely to be different; when W is mainly cooperative,
its cooperative aspects are more likely to be detected and the Nash and Consensus solutions
are more likely to be different. From the perspective of s: when s is far from W ’s efficient
frontier (M1 ∩ M2, W ’s non-cooperative aspect), the two solutions are more likely to be
different; when s is close to W ’s efficient frontier, the two solutions are more likely to be the
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same. We illustrate these (by comparing the Nash and Consensus isosolutions) in Figure
1.11 and conclude this subsection.
Figure 1.11: When the threat is in the grey area, the Nash and Consensus solutions are the same;
otherwise, they are different.
1.4.3 Different Subjective Views
In above, we have stated the objective differences and similarities of the Nash and Consensus
solutions. In below, we shall discuss the different subjective views behind them.
Behind the Nash solution, it is implicitly assumed that a solution is determined by
an exogenous preference that, with the presence of the threat point, can evaluate options
bilaterally. Thus for the purpose of comparing two options, except the threat all other
options do not matter. Correspondingly, when some of other options are removed, Axiom
IIA is used to discover the solution according to the revealed preference.
Behind the Consensus solution, our view is quite the opposite. There is no exogenous
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preference to evaluate options. The options on the table are all we have. They shall be
the sole basis to evaluate themselves. Put it alternatively, they should be peer-reviewed.
Thus, what options are on the table matters even if they are not chosen as the solution.
Based on these ideas, we classify all points of W using s and v into: Individually Irrational,
Consensus, and Bargaining points; and those points, in turn, evaluate the desirability of v.
Furthermore, Individually Irrational points are those that can be vetoed by players’ action
of choosing not to cooperate and we think they should be irrelevant, as shown by Axiom 4.
Consensus points are clearly inferior to v and we think it should not hurt the desirability of v
if there are more, as shown by Axiom 6. Bargaining points are the only type, between which
and v, we do not have a clear tell who is better. This is where different positions can be
taken. And the Consensus solution takes the one of an arbitrator who does not have a direct
preference over options but prefers not to change the solution when there is less bargaining,
as shown by Axiom 5.
In the Nash solution, the threat plays a fundamental role. It is conditional on the
threat that the exogenous preference evaluates options bilaterally.7 That is: the threat
serves as the reference point, as can be seen in Nash’s product, Axiom IIA, and Axiom
6Nb. This has some unintended consequences. First, the Nash solution does not satisfy
a different version of symmetry. In Example 3b, let W ′ and W ′′ be quadrilaterals s1v1vv2
and s1a1a2v2 respectively. For (W ′, s1), both the Nash and Consensus solutions of (W ′, s1)
are v; For (W ′′, s1), the Consensus solution is still v but the Nash solution changes to w1
despite that W ′′\W ′ are symmetric Bargaining points of v. Second, in the Nash solution, the
7. This is necessary because Axiom 3 deprives the meaning of the level of utilities.
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threat always has strategic implications disregarding the cooperative aspect of the bargaining
problem. In Figures 1.8a and 1.8c, whenever we lower one player’s utility of the threat, the
opponent player’s utility of the Nash solution is higher. 8 Effectively, in the Nash solution,
the threat acts like a bargaining chip to obtain higher utilities;
In the Consensus solution, the threat is simply to eliminate Individually Irrational points
and then absent itself from the rest of bargaining. Put it differently, the threat first help
define what the players have in common (Consensus points) and what they disagree with
(Bargaining points) and then let them speak themselves, respecting the cooperative and
non-cooperative aspects of the bargaining problem. Correspondingly, the relative position
of the threat is not essential, as shown by Axiom 6.
In all, the Nash solution focuses on threat s, the anticipation of no-cooperation, and the
Consensus solution focuses on W , what they can obtain via cooperation.
The different views are essentially a matter of modelling choice and logically there is
no right or wrong. However, we still can assess them internally with the bargaining model
that a solution rests on and externally with our common sense in real bargaining situations
that a solution aims to fit. In the Nash’s bargaining model (thus the one of this paper),
players are assumed to be intelligent and rational enough. Therefore, they should be able
to realize that it is nobody’s interest to trigger the threat unless the utilities of the solution
are lower than those of the threat. Thus, the threat itself shall have no strategic implication
beyond eliminating Individually Irrational points. As for our common sense, in Example 1,
the Consensus solution says that they should go biking 40% of the time and go hiking 60%
8. This reflects a general property of the Nash solution. More formally, for bargaining problem (W, s),
when s2 decreases, the Nash solution v1 increases as long as W is smooth at v and there exists w such that
w1 > v1. This is directly implied by equation (2N).
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of the time while the Nash solution says that they should go hiking 100%. And Axioms 6
and 6N provide formal ways for us to evaluate and experiment.
1.5 Other Discussions
1.5.1 (A)symmetry
Axiom 2 directly assumes symmetry. For models where players have no identity differences
other than that they are called player 1 and 2 like the one in this paper, it is a natural
assumption. However, in the real world, identity differences often exists. For example,
bargaining may be between two gangs of different sizes, two kids of different ages, or a labor
union and a firm. In those cases, assuming symmetry may not be be appropriate.
How should we model the asymmetry caused by identity differences? It depends on the
exact meaning of identity differences. If identity differences mean that players have different
strategic advantages, e.g. a larger gang may have more weapons and a larger territory, such
asymmetry should be investigated in richer bargaining models that incorporate the strategic
components; if identity differences do not bear any strategic implication, e.g. a 4-year-old
and 5-year-old bargaining over toys, while it is a moral difficulty to quantify the asymmetry,
the Consensus solution does offer an interface. Consider a weighted version of problem (1min)
min
v≥s,v∈E(W )
c1µ(B1(W, s, v)) + c2µ(B2(W, s, v)) (1.6)
where c1, c2 ≥ 0 satisfying c1+c2 = 2. Clearly, (c1, c2) can be used to quantify the asymmetry.
Intuitively, they are different weights on players’ dissatisfaction. In terms of axiomatization,
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for other c1 and c2, it is not obvious what is the substitute of Axiom 2. But given a non-
empty solution V (·) satisfying all the axioms but Axiom 2, there exists a unique pair of
(c1, c2) such that V (·) is the solution of problem (1.6).
1.5.2 Interpersonal Comparison
While Axiom 3 rules out interpersonal comparison of utilities, sometime it is misunderstood
as no interpersonal comparison at all.
First, players themselves can have interpersonal comparisons. In reality, different interpersonal
comparisons, like envy, equity, and altruism, often comes together with bargaining. For
example, we do see that a child and his parents bargain over his usage of tablets and
consumption of ice-cream both are for the interest of the child. In models, these comparisons
can be built into players’ preferences over physical allocations. For example, the child’s utility
may be uc = xt + xi where xt, xi ∈ [0, 1] stand for his usage of tablet and consumption of
ice-cream respectively and his parents’ utility may be up = 1−x2t −x2i −xc where xc = {1, 0}
stands if the child cries or not. If they do not reach an agreement, the child gets nothing
and cries. We can easily write down the bargaining problem between the child and parents
in the form of (W, s). 9 Here, such comparisons done by players have already be encoded in
(W, s) and shall not be repeated.
Second, solution V (·) can also incorporate interpersonal comparisons. Problem (1min) is
one way to compare players’ dissatisfaction; and problem (1.6) provide many other ways. In
fact, we think that the nature of finding a solution is to conduct interpersonal comparisons.





When conducting interpersonal comparisons, we need to be very careful about two things.
First, interpersonal comparisons should be based on utilities instead of physical allocations.
Otherwise, we may accidentally mix our own preferences into solution V (·). This is not
a concern for Nash’s bargaining model, which is written in terms of utilities. Second,
comparison shall not vary with the measurements of utilities. This is simply because absolute
values of utilities are meaningless.
1.5.3 Axiom 5
Axiom IIA says the solution does not change when there are less points; Axiom 5 says the
same and additionally restricts the lessened to Bargaining points. This additional restriction
makes Axiom 5 avoid some but not all the criticisms on Axiom IIA. For example, suppose W ′,
compared with W , contains less player 1’s Bargaining points of V (W, s). One may expect
that player 2 should benefit from this change. But under Axiom 5, the solution remains
unchanged. Clearly, Axiom 5 sacrifices the principle of compromise, just like Axiom IIA.
But if we look from a different perspective, there is some gain out of this sacrifice. The
solution does not have to be frequently adjusted when the bargaining situation changes
now and then. That is: the solution is stable. While the stability only looks appealing
in the unstructured bargaining model like the one of this paper, it becomes a dominating
factor when the risk is structured into the bargaining models as in Van Damme (1986) and
Binmore et al. (1986). The Nash solution also satisfies Axiom 5 and in these structured
models, emerges to be the solution. And in these models, the Consensus solution is the same
with the Nash solution. In addition, when working together with Axiom 6, its controversial
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effect is more limited. Consider Example 3a. It is the example in which the Consensus
solution performs the worst in the following senses: 1. player 1 has no Bargaining points of
v at all; 2. among all bargaining problems, its ratio of the areas of player 2’s Bargaining
points and v’s Consensus points is the highest (equal to 1
2
).
Furthermore, if we were to discard Axiom 5 together with Axiom 6N, both of which are
arguable, the new solution would be very different from the Nash solution and there might
be a risk of adding further confusions. Thus in this paper, we only discard Axiom 6N and
leave dealing with Axiom 5 in our companion work.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Existence: For any compact set W ⊂ R2, problem (1.3) has a solution.
Proof. Define g(v) ≡ µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v}). Since W is compact, it is sufficient to prove g(·)
is a continuous function.
Because W is compact, it must be bounded. Without loss of generality, assume it is
bounded by a square D ⊂ R2 and D’s edges are parallel with the two axes. Suppose the
length of its each edge is d. For any two points v′, v ∈ R2, we must have
|g(v′)− g(v)| ≤ |v′1 − v1|d+ |v′2 − v2|d
Consider any given v ∈ R2 and a sequence {vk}k=1,2,... in R2 satisfying
∥∥v − vk∥∥ → 0 as
k →∞. From the above inequality, we must have |g(vk)− g(v)| → 0 as k →∞. Thus g(·)
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is continuous, as desired. 
1.6.2 Formal Proof of Lemma 2
To prepare for the formal proof of Lemma 2, we transform µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v}), a function
of a point, into a function of a scalar by parametrizing the efficient frontier E(W ).
Define the area of set {w ∈ W |w1 ≥ v1} as B1(v1); similarly, define the area of set
{w ∈ W |w2 ≥ v2} as B2(v2). Thus we have
µ({w ∈ W |w ≤ v}) = µ(W )−B1(v1)−B2(v2). (1.7)
Define v̄1 = maxv∈E(W ) v1 and v̄2 = maxv∈E(W ) v2.
10 Let I1(w1) be the length of interval






10. They are well defined because E(W ) is compact if W is convex and compact. Because W is compact,
to prove E(W ) is compact, we just need to show E(W ) is closed in W . It is obviously true if W = E(W );
if not, it is equivalent with showing W \ E(W ), the set of inefficient points, is open in W .
For any inefficient point w ∈W , there are two cases:
• there exists some v ∈W such that v1 > w1 and v2 > w2. then there exists a neighborhood U of w in
W such that for any w′ ∈ U v1 > w′1 and v2 > w′2. That is U ⊂W \ E(W ).
• there does not exist v ∈W such that v1 > w1 and v2 > w2. But there must exist v  w because w is an
inefficient point. Without loss of generality, we assume v1 = w1 and v2 > w2. Let v
′ ∈ argmaxw′∈W w′1.
It must be that v1 = v
′
1; otherwise, let v
′′ = tv′ + (1− t)v ∈W , for small enough t, we have v′′1 > w1
and v′′2 > w2. A contradiction with assumption of this case. Thus there exists a neighborhood U of
w in W such that for any w′ ∈ U v1 ≥ w′1 and v2 > w′2. That is U ⊂W \ E(W )
In all, W \ E(W ) is open in W , as desired. Also, W being convex is necessary here. W =







Since W is a convex set, E(W ) can be represented by a strictly decreasing, continuous





= minv∈E(W ) v1. Substitute v2 = f(v1) into equation (1.9), and further substitute
equations (1.9) and (1.8) into (1.7), then we get a function of v1. Denote it as g(v1).













Problem (1.11)’s first order condition is

g′l(v1) ≥ 0 v1 ∈ (v1
¯
, v̄1]




where g′l(·) and g′r(·) are g(·)’s left and right derivatives. 12
In below, we further show in Lemma 4 the equivalence of problem (1.11) and inequality
(1.12) and in Lemma 5 the equivalence of inequality (1.12) and equality (1.2). They together
11. This integration is the definition of area in terms of Riemann integral. It is well defined because I1(·)
is continuous in closed interval [v1, v̄1] therefore integrable.
12. The well-definedness of g′l(·) and g′r(·) is explained shortly.
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Problem (1.3) Equality (1.2)





Figure 1.12: Roadmap of the Proof of Lemma 2
constitute the proof of Lemma 2 as illustrated in Figure 1.12.
Before presenting Lemmas 4 and 5, we need to explicitly express g′l(v1) and g
′
r(v1). Since
f(·) is continuous and concave, its left and right derivatives, f ′l (·) and f ′r(·), are well defined
on (v1
¯
, v̄1] and [v1
¯
, v̄1) respectively. Let cone N(v) be the set of outward normal vectors of
W at v. Notice that N(v)’s two edges are orthogonal with their corresponding supporting
lines whose slopes are respectively equal to f ′l (v) and f
′
r(v). Therefore we denote the two
edges as nl and nr, as shown in Figure 1.13, such that














Notice that I1(v1) = |vv1| and I2(v2) = |vv2|. In below, for convenience, we write them
in short as I1 and I2. Applying the chain rule in equation (1.10) and substituting it with
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Figure 1.13: Normal Vectors
equation (1.13), we have g(·)’s left and right derivatives: 13






















When v1 ∈ (v1
¯









Now we can present Lemmas 4 and 5.
Lemma 4. Suppose W is convex, compact, and full dimensional. v1 is a solution of problem
(1.11) if and only if inequality (1.12) holds.
13. In g′l(v1), −
nl1
nl2
can be −∞ if v1
¯
< v1 = v̄1. Since I2(v) > 0, g
′
l(v1) is still well defined and equal to
−∞.
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Proof. The “Only If” part holds simply because inequality (1.12) is problem (1.11)’s first
order condition.




weakly decreases with v1
because it is concave function f(·)’s left derivative(see equation (1.13)). If I1
I2
also weakly
decreases with v1, then g
′
l(v1)’s sign can only change one direction: from strictly positive to
zero, from zero to strictly negative, and from strictly positive to strictly negative. Therefore
as v1 ∈ [v1
¯
, v̄1] increases, not all of the below three phases necessarily happen, but they have
to happen in the below order:
1. g(v1) strictly increases;
2. g(v1) stays constant;
3. g(v1) strictly decreases.
Thus for problem (1.11), its first order condition, inequality (1.12), is also sufficient.
Thus we just need to prove I1
I2
indeed weakly decreases with v1. Consider any two distinct
efficient points v and v′. Without loss of generality, suppose v1 < v
′
1.v
′1 and v′2 are defined
similarly with v1 and v2. They all are extreme points of W .
Let a1 be the intersection between lines v′1v2 and vv1. It has to be that |vv1| ≥ |va1|. Or
else, v1 would be an interior point of quadrilateral v2vv′v′1. A contradiction with v1 being







Similarly, let a2 be the intersection between lines v′1v2 and v′v′2. It has to be that |v′v′2| ≥
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Notice that the right side of equation (1.16) and the left side of equation (1.17) are both















indeed weakly decreases with v1, as desired. 
Lemma 5. Suppose W is convex, compact, full dimensional, and E(W ) is not a singleton.
For a given v ∈ E(W ), there exists a normal vector n ∈ N(v) such that equality (1.2) holds
if and only if inequality (1.12) holds. Moreover, when inequality (1.12) holds, I1, I2 > 0
(I1 = |vv1| and I2 = |vv2|).
Proof. The proof here involves nothing but carefully dealing with well-definedness and corner











I2 ≤ 0 v1 ∈ [v̄1, v̄1)





















Its leftside is inequality (1.12)(obtained by substituting expression (1.14) into (1.12)). Its
rightside is equality (1.2). The conditions attached to each arrow are what needed to establish
the corresponding direction of equivalence. All of them are as follows:
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(a) if v1 = v1
¯
and v1 = v̄1, inequalities (1.12) still hold;
(b) I2 is strictly positive;















We verify conditions (a)-(d) under the following three cases.
First, when v1
¯
< v1 < v̄1, as shown in Figure 1.13a and 1.13b, the condition of condition
(a) does not apply. Since both player 1 and 2’s Bargaining Points of v are nonempty, thus
I1, I2 > 0. Furthermore, conditions (b), (c) and (d) are satisfied.
Second, when v1 = v1
¯
< v̄1, player 1’s set of Bargaining Points is non-empty. Then
obviously I1 > 0, n
r
2 > 0, and n
l
2 > 0 (condition (c) is satisfied), as shown in Figure 1.13c.




I2 ≤ 0, leftside of equivalence (1.18), implies nr1 > 0 and I2 > 0
(condition (b)). Also I2 > 0 implies n
l
1 = 0, thus I1 −
nl1
nl2
I2 = I1 ≥ 0(condition (a) ). Now
condition (d) clearly holds.
Last, when v1
¯
< v1 = v̄1, it is essentially the same with the second case if in above we
represent the efficient frontier as a function of v2.
Notice that in above three cases, we have also concluded I1, I2 > 0. 
1.6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We just need to show if the solutions of problem (1.11)(therefore problem (1.3)) are not
unique, W has to be an Odd Bargaining set.










proved in Lemma 4 further imply: n1
n2
has to be





being the same for any solution implies that all solutions share and are on the same
supporting line T . Suppose both v and v′ are two distinct solutions. Due to Lemma 2, both
lines v1v2 and v′1v′2 are parallel with T . If v′1v′2 is between v1v2 and T (vv′), either v′1 or v′2
is an interior point of the trapezoid with four vertices v, v′, v1, and v2. A contradiction with
v′1 and v′2 being extreme points of W . Similarly, it cannot be that v1v2 is between v′1v′2
and T (vv′). Thus lines v1v2 and v′1v′2 have to coincide. Call them as line L.
Also according to the proof of Lemma 4, the set of all the solutions has to be connected.
And since g(·) is continuous, it is also closed. Therefore, we can suppose the set of all the
solutions is an interval I. That is W has to be an Odd Bargaining set.
1.6.4 Proof of Theorem 2b
The “If part” of Theorem 2b can be simply verified. In below, we prove its “Only If part.”
Only If part: If V (·) of B satisfies Axioms 1 - 5, and 6N, for any (W, s) ∈ B, V (W, s)
is the solution of problem (1N). Suppose v solves problem (1N). We prove this part by
showing V (W, s) = v.
If E(R(W, s)) is a singleton, due to Axiom 1, we have V (R(W, s), s) = v. Also, due to
Axiom 4, we have V (W, s) = V (R(W, s), s). Thus V (W, s) = v.
If E(R(W, s)) is not a singleton, we prove V (W, s) = v in below eight steps and they are
illustrated in Figure 1.14.
(a) Since v solves problem (1N), according to part (b) of Theorem 1N, we have a normal
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Figure 1.14: Proof of Theorem 2b
vector n at v such that equation (2N) holds. Suppose n’s corresponding supporting
line is T .
(b) Due to Axiom 3, it is equivalent to prove V (W, s) = v after order-preserving affine
transformations on utilities. Implement affine transformations such that both s and v
are symmetric points. Since under the affine transformation equation (2N) still holds.
Thus T ’s slope must be −1.
(c) Let s′ be a point on interval sv that is distinct from s and v. Clearly, s′ is symmetric
Let a1 be the intersection of the vertical line passing v and the horizontal line passing
s′; similarly, let a2 be the intersection of the horizontal line passing v and the vertical
line passing s′.
We choose s′ close enough to v such that both a1 ∈ W and a2 ∈ W whenever possible.
Notice that when a1 ∈ W is not possible, it must be the case that player 1 has no
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Bargaining points of v in (W, s); similarly, for a2. Since E(R(W, s)) is not a singleton,
for at least one player, there are Bargaining points. That is at least we have a1 ∈ W
or a2 ∈ W .
If a1 ∈ W and a2 ∈ W , R(W, s′) contains square sa1va2; if a1 /∈ W and a2 ∈ W ,
R(W, s′) is left to line va1 and above line sa1, that is they are convex set R(W, s′)’s
hyperplane, as shown in Figure 1.14; similarly for a1 ∈ W and a2 6 inW . In any case,
we have W t, the union of R(W, s′) and square sa1va2, is convex.
(d) Let W 1 be the triangle area circumvented by lines T , s′a1, and s′a2. W 1 must be
symmetric. According to Axioms 1 and 2, V (W 1, s′) = v.
(e) Since W t is convex (see step (b)) and also notice that W 1 \W t are players’ Bargaining
points of v, according to Axiom 5, V (W t, s′) = V (W 1, s′) = v.
(f) Now denote R(W, s′) as W 2. Notice that W t \W 2 are Consensus points of v. Thus
according to Axiom 6Na, V (W 2, s′) = V (W t, s′) = v.
(g) Since W 2 ≡ R(W, s′), R(W, s′) = R(W 2, s′). According to Axiom 4, V (W, s′) =
V (W 2, s′) = v.
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2.1 Introduction
The twenty first century has witnessed the rise of big data and big models in the social
sciences. Exponential growth in computational capacity combined with access to new micro-
level datasets have allowed the empirical implementation of models where large numbers of
heterogeneous agents interact simultaneously with each other in myriad ways. While the rise
of big data and big models has introduced empirical content to traditionally theoretical fields,
important questions about the positive properties of these big models remain unresolved.
Two concerns – critical for applied work – are particularly pressing: How can we compute
the solution of an equilibrium system with hundreds or thousands of heterogeneous agents
efficiently? And even if we do calculate a solution, how do we know that the equilibrium we
find is the only possible one?
In this note, we answer these questions for a large class of models where many heterogeneous
agents simultaneously interact in many ways. In particular, we consider systems where N
heterogeneous agents engage in H types of interactions whose equilibrium can be reduced to




fijh (xj1, ..., xjH) , (2.1)
where {xih} ∈ RN×H++ reflect the (strictly positive) equilibrium outcomes for each agent of
each interaction and fijh : RH++ → R++ are the known (differentiable) functions that govern
the interactions between different agents. In particular, fijh is the function that governs the
impact that an interaction with agent j has on agent i’s equilibrium outcome of type h.1
1. These interactions could be market interactions or non-market interactions (as discussed by Glaeser
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As we illustrate, this formulation is sufficiently general to capture models of many different
economic networks – from firm linkages to social networks to the spatial structure of cities.
The contribution of the paper is to provide conditions under which an equilibrium
satisfying equation (2.1) is unique and can be calculated using an iterative algorithm.
The key insight, loosely speaking, is to simplify the analysis by abstracting from agent
heterogeneity and focusing on the strength of economic interactions. Formally, rather than
focusing on the N2×H functions {fijh}, we instead focus on the H×H matrix of the uniform
bounds of the elasticities εhh′ ≡ supi,j,{xjh}
(∣∣∣∣∂ ln fijh({xjh}h)∂ lnxjh′
∣∣∣∣). The conditions provided
depend only on a single statistic of this matrix: its spectral radius being less than one (or,
with additional restrictions on {fijh}, equal to one).2 Moreover, the conditions provided
are shown to be “globally necessary”, i.e. they are the best possible conditions that are
agnostic about the heterogeneity across agents: formally, we show that if the conditions are
not satisfied, there exist {fijh} where multiplicity is assured.
Our main result relies on a multi-dimensional extension of the contraction mapping
theorem, which – to our knowledge – is new and of independent interest in its own right.
The insight of this extension is that it is possible to partition the space of endogenous
variables into subsets, each of which operates in a different metric subspace. This partition
is particularly helpful in economic models where heterogeneous agents interact in many ways
et al. (2003); Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002)).
2. The spectral radius plays a number of important roles in economics, e.g. in the characterization of
macro-economic stability (see e.g. Hawkins and Simon (1949)) and the solution of linearized DSGE models
(Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2016)). More recently, Elliott and Golub (2019) shows that the spectral radius
characterizes the efficiency of public goods provision in networks with non uniform externalities. To our
knowledge, this note is the first to show that the spectral radius of a matrix of elasticities of economic
interactions characterizes the uniqueness of (and the speed of convergence of an iterative algorithm to) the
equilibrium of a network model with many heterogenous agents.
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(i.e. H is large), as it allows us to separate the study of each type of interaction.
To illustrate the versatility of our approach, consider two alternative strategies often
employed to analyze the equilibrium properties of a system. The first alternative strategy
is to recursively apply a process of substitution to re-define the equilibrium system as a
function of fewer economic interactions. For example, in a simple exchange economy with
multiple agents and multiple goods, there are two interactions – buying and selling, which
in equilibrium can be summarized by the value of each agent’s endowment (wages) and
consumption bundle (price index). Alvarez and Lucas (2007) characterize the equilibrium
of such a system by first substituting wages into the price index and then analyzing the
structure of the model only in terms of wages.3 While feasible for small H, the complexity of
this strategy increases exponentially with the number of interactions in the model, creating
a curse of dimensionality for large H.
The second alternative strategy is to “stack” all economic outcomes into a single NH×1
vector and apply standard contraction mapping arguments. The disadvantage of such an
approach is that it treats different types of economic outcomes identically – despite the fact
that they may play very different roles in the equilibrium system. The results in a loss of
information and introduces the possibility that the sufficient conditions may fail despite the
system being unique.4 In contrast, our approach both avoids the curse of dimensionality of
3. Indeed, Allen et al. (2014) show that the sufficient conditions presented in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) –
which rely on showing the gross substitutes property of the system, c.f. Mas-Colell et al. (1995) – can be
relaxed when treating wages and the price index separately. The results here extend those of Allen et al.
(2014) both by allowing for general (non-constant elasticity) functional forms and by allowing for more than
two types of economic interactions.





12 + 1, x12 = x
1
2
12 + 1. It
is straightforward to show that by treating x11 and x12 as a single vector variable, the standard contraction
conditions that the matrix norm (induced by the vector norm) of the system’s Jacobian matrix is strictly
less than one (see e.g. Olver (2008) Chapter 9) are not satisfied, whereas the multi-dimensional contraction
mapping conditions we provide are satisfied. See Online Appendix 2.5.5 for details.
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the first strategy and the loss of information inherent to the second, permitting an analysis
of economic systems with large numbers of interactions.





are constant and identical across agents. This case has emerged as the de-
facto benchmark in the “quantitative” spatial literature, spanning the fields of international
trade, economic geography, and urban economics (see e.g. the excellent review articles by
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017)). We also
offer results that facilitate the analytical characterization of the spectral radius condition
and, as a result, the parametric region where uniqueness and computation is feasible.
We finally apply our theorem to offer new results and extensions of seminal models
from disparate fields in economics, illustrating its broad applicability. In particular, in the
field of spatial economics, we provide uniqueness conditions for quantitative urban models
in the spirit of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) in the presence of spatial productivity and amenity
spillovers. In the field of macroeconomics, we provide uniqueness results for the sectoral
production network in the spirit of Acemoglu et al. (2012) but generalized to allow for non
unit elasticities of substitution as in Carvalho et al. (2019). In the field of social networks, we
provide uniqueness conditions for a model of discrete choice with social interactions in the
spirit of Brock and Durlauf (2001) but generalized to allow for many choices and arbitrary
weights on others’ actions.
A voluminous literature in economic theory has used fixed point theorems to analyze
existence and uniqueness of solutions of economic models. The literature has offered three
main approaches in order to characterize the positive properties of economic models: (1)
use of the contraction mapping theorem; (2) conditions on the Jacobian matrix such as
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it satisfying gross substitution or it being an M-matrix (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
chapter seventeen, Arrow et al. (1971) chapter nine, and Gale and Nikaido (1965)); or (3)
the Index Theorem.5 This paper follows the first approach. While the latter two approaches
are powerful, they are often impractical to apply to situations where many agents interact
in many ways. For example, the Jacobian of equation (2.1) is of size HN2×HN2, making it
difficult to characterize; in contrast, the conditions below depend on a single statistic of an
H ×H matrix.6 Similarly, the the Index Theorem has typically proven impractical to apply
to production economies.7 Our contribution to this literature is to show that for a general
class of models with heterogeneous agents and multiple interactions a multi-dimensional
extension of the contraction mapping theorem can be a powerful tool in characterizing their
properties. The resulting theorem provides easy-to-verify conditions for uniqueness of an
equilibrium and an algorithm for its computation.
The structure of the remainder of the note is as follows: Section 2 presents the multi-
5. Notice that substitutability conditions are effectively conditions on the cross-derivatives of the Jacobian.
Berry et al. (2013) show that a relaxed form of substitutability, weak gross-substitutes, together with strict
connectedness are sufficient for invertibility (in our context, uniqueness). In a setup that maintains the
assumptions of a typical Walrasian economy, Iritani (1981) shows that Weak Indecomposability is necessary
and sufficient for uniqueness. He also shows that a stronger form of Weak Indecomposibility implies
Weak Gross substitutability so these analysis are intimately related. Kennan (2001) shows that concave
monotonically increasing functions have a unique positive fixed point; here, we make no restrictions that
the functions be monotonic, increasing, or concave (although the condition that the spectral radius of the
matrix of bounds of the elasticities be no greater than one does simplify to a requirement of quasi-concavity
in the special case where N = H = 1 and the function being considered is monotonically increasing).
6. Even when the Jacobian can be characterized, the conditions required to establish uniqueness may be too




j for Kij > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). The ith diagonal
term of its Jacobian is 1−αKiixα−1i which can be negative or positive, violating e.g. the classical condition
of Gale and Nikaido (1965) that all principal submatrices of the Jacobian have positive determinants. In
contrast, the spectral radius of the elasticity is α < 1, so uniqueness is established immediately by the
Theorem presented here.
7. See an extensive discussion on the applications of the index theorem to exchange and production
economies in Kehoe (1985); Kehoe et al. (1985). While mathematically powerful, the index theorem
conditions typically lose their sufficiency when attempted to translate them in economically interpretable
conditions.
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dimensional contraction mapping extension (Lemma 1), offers the main result (Theorem 1),
and makes five remarks. Section 3 presents three applications of the result to the fields
of spatial networks, sectoral production networks, and social networks, respectively. For
brevity, the proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are presented in the Appendix, and details of
the remarks and applications are presented in the Online Appendix.
2.2 Main Results
We start our presentation by offering a multi-dimensional extension of the standard contraction
mapping theorem. While of interest in itself, it also facilitates the proof of Theorem 1 below.
Lemma 1. Let {(Xh, dh)}h=1,2,...,H be H metric spaces where Xh is a set and dh is its
corresponding metric. Define X ≡ X1 × X2 × ... × XH , and d : X × X → RH+ such

















T : X → X, suppose for any x, x′ ∈ X
d (T (x) , T (x′)) ≤ Ad (x, x′) , (2.2)
where A is a non-negative matrix and the inequality is entry-wise. Denote ρ (A) as the
spectral radius (largest eigenvalue in absolute value) of A.
If ρ (A) < 1 and for all h = 1, 2, ..., H, (Xh, dh) is complete, there exists a unique fixed
point of T , and for any x ∈ X, the sequence of x, T (x), T (T (x)), ... converges to the fixed
point of T .
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Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1. 
Lemma 1 extends the standard contraction mapping result to multiple dimensions by
replacing the contraction constant with the matrix A. It then states that a simple sufficient
statistic of that matrix – its spectral radius ρ (A) – replaces the role of the contraction
constant in determining the contraction of the system. This sufficient statistic succinctly
summarizes the role of the asymmetry of the impact of the different variables in determining
the positive properties of the system: as long as the spectral radius is less than one there
exists a unique fixed point, and it can be computed by applying the mapping T (x) iteratively,
which converges to the fixed point at a rate ρ (A). Intuitively, a spectral radius of less
than one holds if and only if the sequence limk→∞A
k converges to zero so that repeated
applications of the operator eventually bound the set of points of the sequence arbitrarily
close to the fixed point. Note that Lemma 1 reduces to the standard contraction mapping
theorem if H = 1 (see e.g. Theorem 3.2 of Lucas and Stokey (1989)).
2.2.1 Main Theorem
As mentioned in the introduction, the main result of the paper concerns systems whose
equilibrium can be written as in equation (2.1). Before presenting our main result, some
additional notation is in order. Let N ≡ {1, ..., N} and H ≡ {1, ..., H} correspond to the set
of economic agents and the set of economic interactions, respectively. Let x be an N -by-H
matrix of endogenous economic outcomes, where for i ∈ N and h ∈ H, we (slightly abuse
notation) and let xi denote x’s ith row and x.h to denote x’s hth column. We restrict our
attention to strictly positive {xih}i∈N ,h∈H ∈ R
N×H
++ and strictly positive and differentiable
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{fijh}. Finally, define the elasticity εijh,jh′ (xj) ≡ ∂ ln fijh(xj)∂ lnxjh′ , i.e. εijh,jh′ (xj) is the impact of
agent j′s outcome of type h′ on agent i′s outcome of type h.
Theorem 1. Suppose there exists an H-by-H matrix A such that for all i, j ∈ N , h, h′ ∈ H,
and xj ∈ RH++ |εijh,jh′ (xj)| ≤ (A)hh′. Then:
(i). If ρ (A) < 1, then there exists a unique solution to equation (2.1) and the unique
solution can be computed by iteratively applying equation (2.1) with a rate of convergence
ρ (A);
(ii). If ρ (A) = 1 and:
a. If |εijh,jh′ (xj)| < (A)hh′ for all i, j ∈ N and h, h′ ∈ H when (A)hh′ 6= 0, then equation
(2.1) has at most one solution x;
b. If εijh,jh′ (xj) = αhh′ ∈ R where |αhh′| = (A)hh′ for all i, j ∈ Nand h, h′ ∈ H i.e.




jh′ for some Kijh > 0–then equation (2.1)’s solution is column-
wise up-to-scale unique, i.e. for any h ∈ H and solutions x and x′ it must be x′.h = chx.h for
some scalar ch > 0;




jh′ , then there exists some
{Kijh > 0}i,j∈N ,h∈H such that equation (2.1) has multiple solutions that are column-wise up-
to-scale different.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.2. 
It is important to emphasize that the conditions provided in the Theorem 1 abstract from
the particular heterogeneity of agents – i.e. the particular functions {fijh} – and instead focus
on the magnitude of the economic interactions across all agents, i.e. the uniform bounds on
elasticities |εijh,jh′ (xj)| ≤ (A)hh′ . Loosely speaking, the matrix (A)hh′ captures the degree to
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which the economic outcome of any agent of type h′ can impact any other agents’ economic
outcome of type h. Such conditions that focus on the strength of the economic interactions
rather than the heterogeneity of the agents themselves are advantageous in settings where
the same economic model may be applied to different empirical contexts. For example, in
spatial models, the heterogeneity of agents captures such things like the specific underlying
geography (e.g. trade costs) which are highly context dependent; in contrast, the elasticities
govern the strength of economic interactions (e.g. the elasticity of demand) that may be
similar across locations.
Part (i) of the Theorem applies Lemma 1 to show that there exists a unique solution and
that solution can be computed with an iterative algorithm that converges at a rate ρ (A).
In particular, denote equation (2.1) as x = T (x); then for any initial “guess” of a positive
solution x0 ∈ RN×H++ , one simply iterates x1 = T (x0), x2 = T (x1), x3 = T (x2), ... until
convergence. The restriction that fijh : RN++ → R++ further guarantees that the solution is
strictly positive (something not guaranteed by the original Lemma).
Part (ii) of the Theorem deals with the case of ρ (A) = 1, which turns out to be a
common phenomenon in economic modeling (see Remark 4 below). It establishes uniqueness
by imposing extra conditions on the elasticities εih,jh′ (xj): if either the elasticities are strictly
smaller than their bounds (part ii.a) or the elasticities are constant (part ii.b) then uniqueness
can be assured.
Finally, since whether or not a system of the form of equation (2.1) has a unique solution
in general depends on the particular specification of heterogeneity of agents, our choice to
abstract from agent heterogeneity comes at the cost of preventing us from providing necessary
conditions for uniqueness. Nonetheless, part (iii) of Theorem 1 shows that the conditions
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provided are “globally necessary”. That is, for any matrix of elasticity bounds A such that
ρ (A) > 1, one can construct a set functions that govern the interactions {fijh} with a
corresponding A where multiple equilibria are assured.8 Such functions can be constructed
even restricting attention only to functions with constant elasticities. Put another way, the
sufficient conditions for uniqueness provided in the Theorem 1 are the best that can be
provided when abstracting from agent heterogeneity.
2.2.2 Remarks
We provide below five remarks that both facilitate the implementation and extend Theorem
1. Details are presented in Online Appendix 2.5.3.
The first two remarks provide extensions to Theorem 1.
Remark 1. (Generalized Domain) Although above we define fijh (·) as a function solely of
xj, Theorem 1 can be extended to allow fijh (·) to be a function of the full set of equilibrium
outcomes x for all j i.e. fijh : RN×H++ → R++. Doing so requires replacing the condition on
elasticity |εijh,jh′ (xj)| ≤ (A)hh′ with
∑
m∈N
∣∣∣∂ ln fijh(x)∂ lnxmh′ ∣∣∣ ≤ (A)hh′ . The remainder of Theorem
1 and its proof is unchanged. This generalization allows that the impact that agent j has
on agent i through an interaction of type h can depend on the equilibrium outcomes of any
other agents (including i’s own outcomes).
Remark 2. (Presence of Endogenous Scalars) In addition to equilibrium outcomes for
each agent and interaction, certain economic systems also contain an endogenous scalar that
8. Part (iii) of Theorem 1 extends the result of Allen and Donaldson (2018) to equilibrium systems with
more than two equilibrium interactions (i.e. H > 2).
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fijh (xj1, ..., xjH) , (2.3)
where λh > 0 is endogenous. We offer two results for such systems.
The first result concern the equilibrium system (2.3) with constant elasticities (as in
Theorem 1 part(ii)b). For this form, if ρ (A) = 1, we have the same conclusion as in
part (ii)b: the {xih} of any solution is column-wise up-to-scale unique. If ρ (A) < 1, it is
possible to subsume the endogenous scalars into the equilibrium outcomes through a change
in variables, expressing equation (2.3) as in equation (2.1), which in turn implies that the
{xih} are column-wise up-to-scale unique. (Separating the {xih} and {λh} to determine the
scale of {xih} requires the imposition of further equilibrium conditions, e.g. aggregate labor
market clearing conditions).
The second result concerns the the equilibrium system (2.3) with H additional aggregate
constraints of the form
∑N
i=1 xih = ch for known constants ch > 0. This system has a unique
solution as long as ρ (A) < 1
2
, where A is defined as in Theorem 1. Intuitively, ρ (A) < 1
2
ensures that the feedback effect from changes in the endogenous scalar are small enough to
continue to ensure a contraction.
The next remark facilitates implementation of Theorem 1.
Remark 3. (Change of variables) It is often useful to consider a change of variables of
one’s original equilibrium system when writing it in the form of equation (2.1). A particularly
important example that has found widespread use in spatial economics9 is the following
9. See e.g. Eaton and Kortum (2002); Alvarez and Lucas (2007); Chaney (2008); Arkolakis et al. (2012);
63
















for all i ∈ N and h′ ∈ H where γhh′ , κhh′ , and βhh′ are (h, h′)th cells of matrix Γ, K,
and B, respectively. To transform equation (2.4) to the form of equation (2.1), if Γ−K is




ih′ . Substituting this definition into the right-






jh′ , where αhh′ is the corresponding element
of matrix B(Γ−K)−1, which is in the form of (2.1) with (A)hh′ = |αhh′|. Note that a change
of variables is not just analytically convenient: the presence of the absolute value operator
in Theorem 1 means that a change of variables may reduce the spectral radius, making it
more likely that the sufficient conditions for uniqueness are satisfied.
The last two remarks offer details about the spectral radius.
Remark 4. (Spectral Radius of 1) In practice, ρ (A) = 1 is a general phenomenon in
economic systems which include nominal variables (e.g. prices). Indeed, any economic
system of the form (2.4) that is homogeneous of degree 0 in at least one of its arguments
will have spectral radius ρ (A) equal to 1 or larger. This implies that part (i) of Theorem
1 is applicable to economic systems where all economic interactions are real, whereas part
(ii) of Theorem 1 is applicable to economic systems where some economic interactions are
nominal.
Remark 5. (Characterization of the Spectral Radius) While it is straightforward to
Allen and Arkolakis (2014); Redding (2016); Monte et al. (2018).
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numerically calculate ρ (A) to apply the results of Theorem 1, analytical characterizations
are also possible. We offer two results to facilitate such characterization. The first is well
known: the Collatz–Wielandt Formula (e.g. see Page 670 in Meyer (2000)), implies that if
the summation of each row (or column) of A is less than 1, then ρ (A) ≤ 1.
The second is, to our knowledge, new. Define g (s) as the determinant of matrix sI −A
i.e. g (s) = |sI −A| and denote its k-th derivative as g(k) (s). For any constant s > 0,
ρ (A) ≤ s if and only if g(k) (s) ≥ 0 for all k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
2.3 Applications
In this Section, we apply Theorem 1 to provide new results to three seminal papers examining
spatial networks, production networks, and social networks, respectively. For brevity, we
present only a brief summary of the results here, relegating a more detailed discussion of
each application to Online Appendix 2.5.4.
2.3.1 Spatial Networks
The first example we consider is one of a urban spatial network. We follow the seminal work
of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), where agents choose where to reside and work in a city subject
to commuting costs in the presence of spatial agglomeration spillovers which decay over
space. In that paper, uniqueness is proven only in the absence of these spillovers. Here,
we use Theorem 1 to provide conditions for uniqueness in the presence of agglomeration
spillovers. Unlike Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), however, we assume residential and commercial floor
spaces are exogenously given. Interpreting the spatial network model through the lens of our
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framework, an economic agent is a city block and there are three types interactions between
agents: interactions through the goods market, interactions through the labor (commuting)
market, and interactions through the spatial productivity spillovers. These interactions in
turn determine the three types of equilibrium (strictly positive) outcomes for each agent:
the residential floor price, the number of workers employed, and the productivity. As in the
original paper, let α denote the labor share in the production function, ε > 0 denote the
commuting elasticity, and λ denote the strength of the agglomeration spillover. Applying





, i.e. uniqueness is
guaranteed as long as the agglomeration spillovers are not too large and are bounded above
by a combination of the land share and the commuting elasticity.
We note that this commuting model is one example of how to apply theorem Theorem 1
to spatial networks. In Online Appendix 2.5.4 we also apply Theorem 1 to (1) trade models
with tariffs and and input-output interactions (extending the parameter range provided by
Alvarez and Lucas (2007) where uniqueness is assured); and (2) economic geography models
with agglomeration productivity spillovers that decay across space (extending the frameworks
of Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Redding (2016), where spillovers are assumed to only be
local).
2.3.2 Production Networks
The second example we consider is one of a sectoral production network. We follow the
seminal work of Acemoglu et al. (2012), who consider a production economy where each
sector uses intermediate inputs from every other sector. In that paper, the production
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function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas between labor and intermediates and Cobb-Douglas
across intermediates. Here, we use Theorem 1 to provide conditions for uniqueness when we
allow for a more general production function with non-unit elasticities of substitution both
between labor and intermediates and across intermediates.10
Interpreting this production network through our framework, an economic agent is a
sector, and the interactions are through intermediate input usage. Using Theorem 1, we can
show that the equilibrium is always unique, regardless of the unit elasticity of substitution.
2.3.3 Social Networks
The third example we consider is one of a social network. We follow the seminal work of
Brock and Durlauf (2001), where agents make a discrete choice over a set of actions and
their payoffs of each actions depends on the choices on others in their social network. In
that paper, conditions for uniqueness are provided when agents have a choice set of two
actions and the effect of others’ actions on an agent’s payoffs is summarized by their mean
actions. Here, we apply Theorem 1 to an extension with an arbitrary number of actions in
the choice set and where the effect of others’ actions on an agent’s payoffs is summarized by
a generalized weighted mean, where weights can be individual specific, i.e. we allow for an
arbitrary social network. Unlike Brock and Durlauf (2001), however, we assume private and
social component of utility are proportional rather than additive.
Through the lens of our framework, each individual in the social network is an economic
agent and each of the actions in the choice set comprises a different economic interaction.
10. Carvalho et al. (2019) consider this general formulation and Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019) the
case with unit elasticities between labor and intermediates.
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Each of these interactions in turn result in an equilibrium outcomes for each agent, which
is the expected payoff of choosing each action. As in the original paper, let β denote the
shape value of the extreme value distribution (which governs the relative importance of the
random utility coefficient in agent’s payoff) and let J denote the strength of social spillovers.
Applying Theorem 1, a sufficient condition for uniqueness is βJ < 1
H
where H is the number
of actions in the choice set, i.e. the greater the number of economic interactions, the weaker
the social spillovers must be to ensure uniqueness.
2.4 Conclusion
In this note, we provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness and computation of the
equilibrium for a broad class of models with large numbers of heterogeneous agents simultaneously
interacting in a large number of ways. The conditions are written in terms of the elasticities
of the economic interactions across agents. These results are based on a multi-dimensional
extension of the contraction mapping theorem which allows for the separate treatment of
the different types of these interactions. We illustrate that a wide variety of heterogeneous
agent economies – characterized by spatial, production, or social networks – yield equilibrium
representations amenable to our theorem’s characterization.
By construction, the conditions provided here depend only on the uniform bound of the
elasticities of agent’s interactions on each other’s outcomes rather than the particular form
of the network model; that is, the conditions provided abstract from agent heterogeneity.
We show that should the conditions provided not hold, there exist network models for
which multiplicity is guaranteed, i.e. our conditions are “globally” necessary. However,
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an outstanding and important question remains about how agent heterogeneity itself shapes
the positive properties of model equilibria.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We prove that the sequence generated by the operator converges to a unique point.
To prove convergence we first prove that the sequence is a Cauchy sequence on a complete
metric space. Define dmax (x, x
′) = max (d (x, x′)) as the metric in space X. Clearly (X, dmax)
is complete. Now consider any x ∈ X. Denote x0 = x and for integer n ≥ 1 xn = T (xn−1).
For integers n and m, suppose n < m. We have

































Notice if ρ (A) < 1 then An converges to zero matrix and (I−A)−1 is finite. Furthermore,
for n < m, dmax (x
n, xm) → 0 as n → ∞. Therefore {xn}n=1,2,... is a Cauchy sequence on a
complete metric space and it has a limit.
To prove existence denote the limit of the sequence y = limn→∞ x
n in X. We claim
T (y) = y. This is because T (·) is continuous, which is implied by the following formula
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dmax (T (x) , T (x
′)) ≤ max (Ad (x, x′))
≤ Hāmax (d (x, x′))
= Hādmax (x, x
′)
where ā is the largest element of matrix A. Finally, by a standard contradiction argument
the point has to be unique. We thus have established convergence, existence, and uniqueness.

2.5.2 Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Define y = lnx i.e. for any h ∈ H i ∈ N yik = lnxik. Thus, equation (2.1) can
be equivalently rewritten as yih = ln
∑





εijh,jh′ (exp yj) fijh (exp yj)∑
j∈N fijh (exp yj)
(2.6)
For any y and y′, according to mean value theorem, there exists some tih ∈ [0, 1] such that
ŷ = (1− tih) y + tihy′ satisfies for each i and h










Part (i): Combine the above two equations (2.6) and (2.7) with condition |εih,jh′ (xj)| ≤
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(A)hh′ , we have
|gih (y)− gih (y′)| ≤
∑
j∈N ,h′∈H
(A)hh′ fijh (exp yj)∑






∣∣yjh′ − y′jh′∣∣ . (2.8)
For any h ∈ H, define dh (yh, y′h) = max
j∈N
∣∣yjh − y′jh∣∣ and Yh = RN . dh (·, ·) is a metric on






dH (yH , y
′
H)
 for y, y
′ ∈ Y .
Notice that inequality (2.8) then becomes d (g (y) , g (y′)) 5 Ad (y, y′). Thus we can apply
Lemma 1 to obtain the desired results (existence, uniqueness and computation).
For the purpose of the computation, instead of applying the iterative procedure in the
space Y = RN×H according to Lemma 1, it is equivalent to do so in the space where x lies
on, i.e. RN×H++ .
Part (ii.a):Suppose there are two distinct solutions y and y′ i.e. yih = gih (y) and
y′ih = gih (y
′). We will arrive at a contradiction. Substitute these two solutions into equation
(2.7). Also |εih,jh′ (xj)| < (A)hh′ when (A)hh′ , as long as the right side of equation (2.8) is
not zero, we have




|yih′ − y′ih′ | . (2.9)
Thus we have d (y, y′) ≤ Ad (y, y′) and the inequality strictly holds as long as the right side is
not zero. Since y and y′ are distinct. We must have d (y, y′) as a nonzero nonnegative vector.
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670 in Meyer (2000)), we have ρ (A) > 1. A contradiction.
Part (ii.b): We will again argue by contradiction. Suppose a pair of solutions x and x′










∣∣yjh − y′jh + s∣∣. For any h ∈ H, we can suppose we have
sh and jh such that dh =
∣∣yjhh − y′jhh + sh∣∣.
Combine the above two equations (2.6) and (2.7) with condition εih,jh′ (xj) = αhh′ where
|αhh′ | = (A)hh′ , we have







j∈N fijh (exp ŷj)
(





|αhh′ | dh′ (2.10)
where ŝh =
∑
h′∈H αhh′sh′ . Notice that dh ≤ maxi∈N |yih − y
′
ih + ŝh|. Therefore we have
dh ≤
∑
h′∈H |αhh′ | dh′ ≤
∑
h′∈H (A)hh′ dh′ i.e.
d 5 Ad. (2.11)
If dh > 0, there there must exists h
′ such that dh′ > 0 and αhh′ 6= 0. For any h′ dh′ > 0,
according to the definition of dh′ there must exist some j ∈ N such that
∣∣yjh′ − y′jh′ + sh′∣∣ <




h′∈H |αhh′ | dh′ ≤
∑
h′∈H (A)hh′ dh′ . Thus, again, according to the Collatz–Wielandt
Formula, we have ρ (A) > 1, which is a contradiction.
Part (iii): Consider {Kijh > 0}i,j∈N ,h∈H which satisfies
∑
j∈N Kijh = 1 for any i. Obviously,
x = 1 is one solution of equation (2.4). In the following we are going to construct {Kijh > 0}i,j∈N ,h∈H
such that there exists another different solution.
As we have ρ (A) > 1, suppose z is A’s non-negative eigenvector such that ρ (A) z =
Az. For a given h, divide H = {1, 2, ..., H} into two sets H−h = {h′|αhh′ ≤ 0} and H
+
h =







Now we construct x̄ ∈ RN×H++ . If j ∈ N 0, for any h′, x̄jh′ = 1; if j ∈ N+h , x̄jh′ =
exp (zh) h
′ ∈ H+h
exp (−zh) h′ ∈ H−h
; if j ∈ N−h , x̄jh′ =

exp (−zh) h′ ∈ H+h
exp (+zh) h
′ ∈ H−h
. Obviously, x′ is column-
wise up-to-scale different from x. In below, we show there exists {Kijh > 0}i,j∈N ,h∈H such






























































In the last term of above equation, for any j /∈ N+h ∪N
−
h , we have exp
(∑













. Notice that exp
(∑
h′∈H |αhh′ | zh
)
= exp (ρ (A) zh)
where ρ (A) > 1. Therefore, we can adjust the value of {Kijh}j∈I while keeping
∑
j∈N Kijh =





jh′ = x̄ih as desired.

2.5.3 Further Details of Remarks
In this section, we provide further details for the remarks discussed in the paper.
Remark 1
Extending the domain of fijh to all x requires only a small change to the proof of Theorem 1,




















[∣∣∣∂ ln fimh(x)∂ lnxjh′ ∣∣∣] fimh (exp y)∑









∣∣∣∑j∈N ∂ ln fimh(x)∂ lnxjh′ ∣∣∣ fimh (exp y)∑





∣∣yjh′ − y′jh′∣∣ .
The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 remains unchanged.
74
Remark 2











where λh > 0 is endogenous. In the case that ρ (A) = 1, we have the same conclusion as
in part (ii)b: the {xih} of any solution is column-wise up-to-scale unique. The proof of this
result is exactly the same as part (ii)b of Theorem 1.
If ρ (A) < 1, it is possible to subsume the endogenous scalars into the equilibrium
outcomes through a change in variables, expressing equation (2.13) as in equation (2.1).




h′ , where dh′his the h
′hth element of the H ×H matrix
(I−α)−1 and α ≡ (αhh′) (i.e. α is the matrix of elasticities without the absolute value










Note that because ρ (A) < 1, then so too is ρ (α) < 1, so that (I−α)−1 exists. From
Theorem 1 part (i), the {x̃ih} are unique and can be calculated using an iterative algorithm,
which in turn implies that the {xih} are column-wise up-to-scale unique. (Separating the
{xih} and {λh} to determine the scale of {xih} requires the imposition of further equilibrium
conditions, e.g. aggregate labor market clearing conditions).
Consider now equilibrium system (2.3) withH additional aggregate constraints
∑N
i=1 xih =
ch for known constants ch > 0.
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fijh (xj1, ..., xjH)
withH additional aggregate constraints
∑N
i=1 xih = ch for known constants ch > 0. Substituting











j′=1 fi′j′h (xj′1, ..., xj′H)
)
,







j′=1 fi′j′h (xj′1, ..., xj′H). We can define the new function:
gij,h (x) ≡






j′=1 fi′j′h (xj′1, ..., xj′H)



























if m 6= j
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so that:
∣∣∣∣∂ ln gij,h∂ lnxm,l
∣∣∣∣ =






if m = j
∑
o
∣∣∣∂ ln fom,h∂ lnxm,l ∣∣∣ fom,k(xp,l)∑o,p fop,k({xp,l}) if m 6= j
so that:













if m 6= j
Finally, we can sum across all m locations to yield:
∑
m































∣∣∣∣∂ ln gij,k∂ lnxm,l
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 |Akl| .




Here we provide a simple example of the claim that “The presence of the absolute value
operator in Theorem 1 means that a change of variables may reduce the spectral radius,
making it more likely that the sufficient conditions for uniqueness are satisfied.”









From Remark 1, a sufficient condition for uniqueness is that
∑
m∈N
∣∣∣∂ ln fijh(x)∂ lnxmh′ ∣∣∣ ≤ (A)hh′ =∣∣−1
2
∣∣ + |1| = 3
2





j , where x̃i = x
3
2
i has a spectral
radius of 2
3
. Hence, the sufficient condition for uniqueness provided from Theorem 1 is
satisfied for the transformed system but not the original system.
Remark 4




≥ 1. Suppose for
some h̄ ≥ 1 that {x.h}h=1,...,h̄ are nominal variables. Then if we construct {x̄.h}h∈H by scaling
{x.h}h=1,...,h̄ up to t times and keeping all other entries unchanged, the constructed {x̄.h}h∈H
should still solve the equation. Therefore we can write
ΓT = BT,
where T is a H-by-1 vector and
Th =

t h ≤ h̄
0 other case
.





Γ−1, BΓ−1 also has eigenvalue of 1. We define matrix A as the absolute value of
BΓ−1 (i.e. each entry of matrix A is the absolute value of the corresponding entry in matrix




∥∥(BΓ−1)n∥∥ 1n = ρ (BΓ−1).
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Remark 5
We prove a necessary and sufficient condition such that ρ (A) ≤ 1.
Lemma 2. Let A be a non-negative n × n matrix. The function f (λ) is defined as the
determinant of matrix λI −A i.e. f (λ) = |λI −A| , and its k-th derivative is denoted by
f (k) (λ). Then ρ (A) ≤ s if and only if f (k) (s) ≥ 0 for all k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
Proof. If part: Notice that f (n) (s) = n! > 0. Then f (n−1) (λ) strictly increases with λ.
So f (n−1) (λ) > 0 for λ ∈ [s,∞). Using deduction we obtain f (λ) is strictly increasing and
f (λ) ≥ 0 for any λ ∈ [s,∞]. According to Perron–Frobenius theorem, ρ (A) is A’s largest
eigenvalue, so that f (ρ (A)) = 0. Thus, by strict monotonicity it must be ρ (A) ≤ s.
Only If part: According to the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra (e.g. see Corollary
3.6.3 of Fine and Rosenberger (1997)), f (λ) can be decomposed as f (λ) = f1 (λ) f2 (λ)






and f2 (λ) =
∏
i∈R (λ− λi) where λi is conjugate
of λi and C and R are set of indexes. For all i ∈ C, λi is a complex number and for all





2 (λ) where Dk = {k1, k2|k1 + k2 = k, k1, k2 ≥ 0}. When i ∈ R λi ≤
ρ (A) (from Perron–Frobenius theorem), we have f
(k2)













where k2,i ≥ 0 and
∑














s+ λiλi > 0 k2,i = 0
2 (s− Re (λi)) k2,i = 1
2 > 0 k2,i = 2
0 k2,i > 3
,
where Re (λi) is real part of λi. As Re (λi) < ‖λi‖ ≤ ρ (A) ≤ s (the second inequality is also







](k2,i) ≥ 0. In all, f (k) (s) ≥ 0
k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1.

2.5.4 Applications
In this section, we provide more detail for the three examples discussed in Section 2.3.
Spatial Networks
The first set of applications is examples where interactions across heterogeneous agents take
place in space. We consider an urban model (extending the results of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)),
an economic geography model (extending the results of Allen and Arkolakis (2014)), and a
trade model (extending the results of Alvarez and Lucas (2007)) in turn.
Urban Model Here we prove the uniqueness of the quantitative urban framework of
Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) with endogenous agglomeration spillovers but assume residential and
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commercial land are exogenously given. In terms of our framework, each city block is a
different economic agent and there are three different economic interactions, each represented
by an equilibrium condition. The first economic interaction is through the goods market,













is the total income of the residents living in location i, Qi is the rental
price in location i, wj, is the wage in location j, and Kij = Φ
−1TiEjd
−ε
ij H > 0 is a matrix
incorporating the commuting costs between locations.
The second economic interaction is through the labor (commuting) market, where we
require that the total number of agents working in a location, HMi, is equal to the number









Finally, the third economic interaction is through the spatial productivity spillover, where













Given the assumed Cobb-Douglas production function and the assumed fixed amount






equations to create three equilibrium conditions that are a function of three outcomes: the
price of residential land, the number of agents working in a location, and the productivity of a
location. Observe that equations above are of the form of equation 2.4 with {Qi, HMi, Ai}i=1,...,S
as endogenous outcome variables.11 And the corresponding Γ and B are respectively
1 + ε (1− β) 0 0





0 (α− 1) (1 + ε) 1 + ε

















Recall from Remark 5 that if the summation of each row of A is less than 1, then we have







Economic Geography Model We now consider the framework of Allen and Arkolakis
(2014). The model yields the same mathematical equilibrium system as in Redding (2016)
and Allen et al. (2014) and thus the results apply in all these models. We extend that







11. Although Φ is also an endogenous variable, it is not location specific. Treating it exogenously is
equivalent with the equilibrium. (The equivalence can be shown by scaling {Qi, HMi, Ai}i=1,...,S .)
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where Ai represents the productivity of region i, Āi its exogenous component and Li the labor
in region i that is determined in equilibrium. KAij represents spatial spillovers in productivity
and α the spillover elasticity that is common across locations. Furthermore, appropriately
replacing the equilibrium conditions (corresponding to equations 10 and 11 of Allen and































where wi is the wage in location i, ūi the exogenous amenity, β the local amenity spillover
elasticity and σ the demand elasticity. Tij represents the matrix of trade costs to ship goods
across locations.12
We can write the parametric parametric matrices corresponding to Theorem 1 as
Γ =

1 1− σ σ
β (1− σ) 0 1− σ
0 1 0
 , B =

1 + β (σ − 1) 0 σ







σ−1 σ − 1





12. Overall amenity of living in a location i is ui = ūiL
β
i ,i.e. it depends on local population. The amenity





1 + β (σ − 1) βσ σ − 1 + β (σ − 1)2
β (σ − 1)2 βσ (σ − 1) + 1 σ − 1 + β (σ − 1)3
α ασ
σ−1 α (σ − 1)
 .
We consider the case that β < 0 < α which allows for the spectral radius to be less
or equal than one. The case α, β ≥ 0 always implies a spectral radius bigger than one.


























. There is a number of












> 0 i.e. β > − 1
σ(σ−1) , then we have
∣∣BΓ−1∣∣ =

1 + β (σ − 1) −βσ σ − 1 + β (σ − 1)2
−β (σ − 1)2 βσ (σ − 1) + 1 σ − 1 + β (σ − 1)3
α ασ
σ−1 α (σ − 1)
 .
A sufficient condition for ρ
(∣∣BΓ−1∣∣) ≤ 1 is that the summation of each column is smaller
than 1 (see Remark 5). Thus we have
α + β (σ − 1) (2− σ) ≤ 0
ασ
σ − 1
+ βσ (2− σ) ≤ 0
α + βσ (σ − 1) ≤ 1
σ − 1
− 2.
The three inequalities and β > − 1
σ(σ−1) can guarantee ρ
(∣∣BΓ−1∣∣) ≤ 1 and, therefore,
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uniqueness.
Trade Model with Tariffs We now analyze the celebrated Ricardian model developed
by Eaton and Kortum (2002) specified with tariffs and input-output network as in Alvarez
and Lucas (2007).
The equilibrium of their model can be characterized by the three equations below (corresponding









































λj is country i’s per capita spending on tradeables that is
spent on goods from country j and sfi =
α[1−(1−β)Fi]
(1−α)βFi+α[1−(1−β)Fi] is labor’s share in the production
of final goods (equations 3.10 and 3.16 in Alvarez and Lucas (2007)) and the endogenous
variables are: pmi, the price index of tradeables in country i; Fi, the fraction of country i’s
spending on tradeables that reaches producers; and wi, country i’s wage. Finally, ωij is the
bilateral tariff.
Now we show how to transform the equilibrium equations into the form of equation (2.4).





































Third, define F̃i ≡ α + (β − α)Fi, substitute equation (2.19) into it, and notice that∑n
j=1 Dij = 1. Thus we have F̃i =
∑n
j=1Dij [α + (β − α)ωij] .Again, substitute the expression
of Dij, multiply both sides by p
−θ

















Last, substitute the expressions of sfi and Dji into equation (2.18) , subsequently replace




























Now we have transformed the equilibrium equations into the form (2.4) but with four
set of endogenous variables
{
pmi, Fi, F̃i, wi
}
i=1,2,...,n
. Notice that all the kernels, K1ij, ..., K
4
ij,





−θ 0 0 0
−θ 1 0 0
−θ 0 1 0




− (1− β) θ 0 0 −βθ
− (1− β) θ 0 0 −βθ
− (1− β) θ 0 0 −βθ
θ 0 −1 1

The determinant of Γ is − 1
βθ2+θ




1− β 0 0 β
0 0 0 0








Here 1 ≥ θ(1 − β)β or β ≥ 1
2
is sufficient for ρ
(∣∣BΓ−1∣∣) ≤ 1 i.e. we have (up-to-
scale) uniqueness. In comparison, the essential conditions for uniqueness in Alvarez and
Lucas (2007) are i) (mini,j=1,2,...,n {κij}mini,j=1,2,...,n {ωij})
2
θ ≥ 1 − β; ii) α ≥ β; iii) 1 −
mini,j=1,2,...,n {ωij} ≤ θα−β (see their Theorem 3).
13
Production Networks
We next study economic interactions that arise from from input-output production linkages.
13. If 1 ≥ θ(1 − β)β, we can solve explicitly the eigenvalues are
{
0, 0, 1, (1−β)−βθ1+βθ
}







2. According to Lemma 2, we can check the value of f (k) (1) for
k = 0, 1, 2, 3, a sufficient condition to guarantee ρ
(∣∣BΓ−1∣∣) ≤ 1 is β ≥ 12 . (In this case the sufficient and
necessary condition is 4β3− 2β2 + 2/θ+ 5β/θ ≥ 0 and 2β3 + 2β2 +β+ 4β/θ− 1/θ ≥ 0 when 1 < θ(1−β)β.)
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Constant Elasticity Among Intermediates
We first consider a direct extension of the framework by Acemoglu et al. (2012) where the
production function is Cobb-Douglas in labor and intermediates. Instead, we assume that
intermediates across all sectors are aggregated through a constant elasticity of substitution
aggregator different sectors with an elasticity σ. This extension is explicitly discussed in
Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019) as a special case of the nested CES case considered by













where zi stands for the productivity and is exogenous, li is the labor, xji is the intermediate
goods from sector j, and α1 + α2 = 1.






where we define ᾱ = αα11 α
α2
2 , w is the wage, and the price index of intermediate goods Pi is







where τji stands for the standard iceberg trade cost but can be interpreted here as the cost

















Normalize the wage w to be 1. Notice that since zi is exogenous, this equation (for all i)
determines the price indexes {Pi}. Therefore, as long as consumer utility function satisfies
concavity condition, this equation alone can represent the equilibrium. Define xi ≡ P 1−σi










= α2, so uniqueness and convergence of an iterative operator require
|α2| < 1, which is satisfied as long as labor is used in production.
Constant Elasticity Between Intermediates and Factors We now consider the generalization
of the production networks setup in Acemoglu et al. (2012) as discussed in Carvalho et al.
(2019) to incorporate constant elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
Consider a static economy consisting of n competitive firms denoted by {1, 2, · · · , n}, each















where li is the amount of labor, zi is the (exogenous) labor productivity, and the intermediate
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We remark that Carvalho et al. (2019) also include firm-specific capital in the production
function; however, given that it is assumed to be supplied inelastically, it is isomorphic to
the exogenous labor productivity term zi.
Solving the cost minimization problem of the firm results in the following system of
equations for equilibrium prices:










which in turn can be written as:
(




























































j + (1− µ) (zj)
1−σ
=⇒








j + (1− µ) (zj)
1−σ
< 1,
so that by Theorem 1 (part ii.a), there exists at most one equilibrium.
Social Networks
Here we consider a discrete choice framework with social interactions as in Brock and Durlauf
(2001), generalized to include a choice set of more than two actions. Suppose there are N
individuals where each individual i ∈ {1, ..., N} chooses from a set of H actions, where
hi ∈ {1, ..., H} indicates her choice. Let the N -tuple ω ≡ {h1, ...., hN} denote the actions by
entire population and let ω−i denote the actions of all individuals except i.
Let agent i′s payoffs for choosing action h consists of three components:
Vih = uih + Sih (ω−i) + εih,
where uih is the private utility associated with choice h, Sih (ω−i) is the social utility
associated with the choice, and εih is a random utility term, independently and identically
distributed across agents. In equilibrium, an agent will choose the action hi that maximizes
her payoffs given the actions of others, i.e:




Define µijh to be the conditional probability measure agent i places on the probability that
agent j chooses action h. We assume that Sih (ω−i) takes the following form:








where J governs the strength of the social interaction, ωij,h (normalized so that
∑
j 6=i ωij,h =
1) are weights that agent i places on agent j’s choice of action h to capture heterogeneity in
the social network connections, and the parameter η ∈ (−∞,∞) determines what type of
mean aggregation is used across other individuals (e.g. η = −∞ is the minimum, η = −1 is
the harmonic mean; η = 0 is the geometric mean; η = 1 is the arithmetic mean; and η =∞
is the maximum). We note that the log transform on the social utility function – not present
in the primary case considered by Brock and Durlauf (2001) – ensures that the uniqueness of
the equilibrium can be characterized without reference to an (endogenous) threshold value
(c.f. Brock and Durlauf (2001) Proposition 2).
The presence of weights ωij,h and the flexibility of the particular mean function (governed
by parameter η) – both of which are absent in the particular functional forms characterized
by Brock and Durlauf (2001) – allow for flexible social interactions between individuals in
the network. However, the uniqueness conditions provided below turn out to only depend on
the strength of the social interaction J . Note that without loss of generality we can define
the private utility as follows uih ≡ ln vih, which allows us to interpret J as the parameter
which governs the extent to which social interactions determine the choice of agents. A value
of J = 0 means that decisions are only made by private considerations of utility, whereas a
value J = 1 means that social utility and private utility vih are given equal proportions in
92
the utility function.
Retaining the assumption from Brock and Durlauf (2001) that the random utility term
follows an extreme value distribution with shape parameter β and agent’s conditional probabilities
are rational (so that µijh = µjh for all j ∈ {1, ..., N} and µjh is equal to the probability agent j
actually chooses action h) results in the following equilibrium conditions for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}

















Note this is a system of N ×H equilibrium conditions in N ×H unknown probabilities µjh.
Equation (2.27) is a special case of (2.1). To see this, define yih ≡ µ
η
Jβ






















































































if j 6= i and fiih = 0 results in




fijh (xj1, ..., xjH) ,










 ∈ [0, βJ ]









 ∈ [−βJ, 0]
So that if we define:
(A)hh′ ≡ βJ
then we have for all h, h′: ∣∣∣∣∂ ln fij,h∂ lnxj,h′
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (A)hh′
Since the largest eigenvalue of a constant positive square matrix is that constant divided by
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the number of rows, Theorem 1(i) implies that we have uniqueness as long as βJ < 1
H
. Hence,




Here we illustrate the importance of treating the endogenous as H vectors with N elements
instead of one giant variable with NH elements. To focus on the ideas, we set N = 1.











(Here, in order to be consistent with the paper, we do not suppress the notation of N .)
We show when the system is treated as a single 2 × 1 vector, it is not a contraction. We
















































For two y and y′, applying the mean value theorem on the two single-valued functions of
T (·), we have
|T (y)− T (y′)| ≤ A |y − y′| (2.31)
To apply the standard contraction mapping, we treat y1 and y2 as a single vector variable.
We consider two natural choices of norms to serve for the metric used in the contraction





For the first norm, according to inequality (2.31), we have
‖T (y)− T (y′)‖max ≤ 2 ‖y − y
′‖max .
Clearly, the standard contraction mapping does not apply.
For the second norm, again according to inequality (2.31), we have
‖T (y)− T (y′)‖ ≤ ‖A‖ ‖y − y′‖
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where ‖A‖ is the A’s matrix norm. Here ‖A‖ ≈ 2.118. Again, the standard contraction
mapping does not apply.
In constrast, applying our multi-dimension contraction mapping, we treat y1 and y2 as
two separate variables.We immediately have ρ (A) = 1
2





with Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis
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3.1 Introduction
As of 2014, 54% of people worldwide live in cities. This is an increase from 34% in 1960,
and urban population is expected to increase by more than 1% per year in the upcoming
decades. This unprecedented concentration is indicative of the large agglomeration economies
that take place in shorter distances and lead firms and individuals to cluster in cities. While
local governments have a large array of potential policy tools at their disposal (e.g. zoning
policies, subsidies, infrastructure projects, etc.), little is known about how a city can best take
advantage of these agglomeration economies in order to improve the welfare of its citizens.
In this paper, we develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of a city that incorporates
the agglomeration forces within the city and allows us to examine the welfare effects of
zoning policies. Our model has three key ingredients. First, following a large literature on
the economics of the city we assume that agents make commuting choices (see e.g. Anas and
Kim (1996), Anas and Rhee (2006), Ahlfeldt et al. (2012)) i.e. they choose where to live and
work. Second, we assume that there are spatial spillovers of productivity. Specifically, the
productivity in one location may depend on the distribution of agents working within the
city. Last, we assume that firms produce the good using commercial buildings and labor as
perfectly complementary inputs and agents have Cobb-Douglas preferences over residential
buildings and the good. Among the above three ingredients, agents’ commuting choices are
the nexus connecting the rest of the model; spatial spillovers of productivity imply that
agents’ commuting choices have externality and open up the possibility for interventions by
the city planner to be welfare improving; and since residential and commercial building can
affect agent’s commuting choices, zoning policies can serve as tools for the city planner to
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correct the externality. Despite the rich interplay among its different ingredients, the model
remains tractable. In particular, we present two sets of results that facilitate the use of this
model to evaluate zoning policies.
The first set (Proposition 1) is about the positive aspect of the model. We prove that for
any zoning policy that allocates the aggregate residential and commercial buildings, there
always exists a competitive equilibrium allocating the rest of resources. While this result is
not surprising, it is reassuring that zoning policy is compatible with the rest of the market
despite many spatial linkages present in the model. The second set (Proposition 2) is about
the normative aspect of the model. We assign the city planner to maximize agents’ average
utility. When there are no spatial spillovers, we show that the market is the same with the
city planner. This ensures that compared with the market, the difference of the city planner
does not lie in redistribution but only efficiency. We then consider how the city planner
can improve welfare and provide an explicit formula to evaluate the welfare effect of zoning
policy in practice.
Our approach is related with the standard general equilibrium analysis of welfare used
in trade and geography models (see, for example, Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Allen and
Arkolakis (2014)). Also, our model is connected with urban models where residential and
working locations are separated by commuting frictions (see Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Lucas
and Rossi-Hansberg (2003), Ahlfeldt et al. (2012), Anas and Kim (1996), Anas and Rhee
(2006)and Ioannides (2013) for a comprehensive review). We contribute to this literature
by adding an actual geography of the city (as in Ahlfeldt et al. (2012)) and in addition by
providing the apparatus to characterize the equilibrium of the model as well as the planner so
as to analyze local policy interventions. Finally, our work is also related to a urban literature
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that analyzes optimal spatial policy use in the presence of externalities, reviewed in Glaeser
and Gottlieb (2008). Closer to our approach, Turner et al. (2014) evaluate the effect of land
use regulation on the value of land use and on welfare. The authors exploit cross-border
changes in development, prices, and regulation in regions near municipal borders together
with detailed data on the land use and regulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present the
theoretical model. In Section 3, we present our formal results. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Model
This section describes the theoretical model. The premise of the model is similar to the
canonical Alonso-Mills-Muth model (Alonso et al. (1964), Mills (1967), Muth (1969) see
Ioannides (2013) ch. 5 for a description) and in particular we assume individuals have
preferences over good consumption and housing and their income is determined by their
working productivity and time. We assume a perfectly competitive good market with firms
that use land and labor to produce. Now we proceed to formally introduce the model.
3.2.1 Model Setup
We consider a city consisting of a set of locations Θ = {1, 2, ..., N} that we denote with
subscripts i or j. There is a building endowment Hi > 0 at each location i ∈ Θ which can
be put in residential, HRi ≥ 0, or commercial use, HCi ≥ 0,
HRi +HCi ≤ Hi.
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There are two types of players in the city: firms and agents. Firms organize production only
within commercial area i.e. locations where there are positive commercial building; agents
live and consume in residential area and work in commercial area.
Agents
Let Ω be the set of all agents and µ (.) be the measure defined in set Ω. µ (Ω) represents
he number of population. Throughout this paper, we denote µ (Ω) as L̄. Agents live and
consume in residential area and work in commercial area. Agents can only live in one location
and work in one location. But agents do not have to work and live in the same location.




where ui stands for amenity of location i where the agent lives; q is the good consumed by
the consumer; h is the quantity of housing the agent consumes; and β ∈ (0, 1).
The only heterogeneity agents have is their location-specific productivity. Agent ω’s
productivity a (ω) = [aj (ω)]j∈Θ ∈ R
N
++, where aj (ω) stands for ω’s productivity in location
j. Regarding the distribution of productivity a (ω), we follow Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Ahlfeldt et al. (2012). Specifically, we assume that the idiosyncratic productivity, aj (ω),
follows a Frechet distribution with shape parameter θ, i.e. Pr [aj (ω) ≤ u] ∼ e−u
−θ
. We also
assume aj (ω) is independent across different working places, i.e. aj (ω) ⊥ ak (ω) for any
j 6= k j, k ∈ Θ.
The agent has one unit of time that can be used to work. If agent ω chooses to live in i
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and work in j, she has tij ≡ 1− dij unit of time left working, where dij represents the time
spent in commuting. Therefore, her wage income in total is
wjaj (ω) tij
where wj is the wage at location j for agents with productivity 1 working one unit time.
Every agent equally owns all the residential and commercial buildings and therefore
receives the same capital income k, which will be defined later. Thus her total income is
y = k + wjaj (ω) tij.
The timing of agents making decisions is as follows. Agents first choose where to live;
they then observe their idiosyncratic location-specific productivity; they finally decide where
to work and how to consume. Therefore, in below we use backward induction to solve the
agent’s problem.
Solving The Agent’s Problem First, given the agent’s total income y and the choice






pq + rRih ≤ y, (3.2)
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where p and rRi are the price of good and rent of residential housing at location i respectively.
The Cobb-Douglas preference over the consumption good and housing implies that the agent
spends a constant share of income β in the consumption good and 1 − β in housing. Thus




where c = ββ (1− β)1−β (For convenience of notation, in the following we omit the constant,
as it does not affect agent’s decision).
Second, given the realized productivity a (ω) and the choice that she chooses to live at
location i, the agent chooses where to work by maximizing her total consumption, which is
equivalent to maximize her total income i.e. maxj∈Θ k + wjaj (ω) tij. Clearly, the agent just













. The macro variables including wj, p, and rRi can be determined
in equilibrium. Therefore, the agent can take them as given and only form beliefs over
her wage income maxj∈Θwjaj (ω) tij. Using the Frechet distribution, we can obtain its

































Firms produce goods in commercial area. We assume all firms at location j have the same
production function
q = Aj min (l, h) .
where Aj is firm’s productivity, l is the effective units of labor, and h is the amount of
commercial building rented. We assume the goods and input market are perfectly competitive.
Therefore, firms solve the below problem
max
l,h
pq − wjl − rCjh, (3.3)
where p is the price of goods; wj is the wage of per effective unit labor; and rCj is the rent
of commercial building in location i. We have the solution of firm’s problem

l = h = 0 pAj < wj + rCj
l = h ≥ 0 pAj = wj + rCj




Having determined the behavior of each agent and firm individually, we next turn to aggregating
individual decisions to the level of the city.
Agent Side First, since we assume all agents hold an equal share of all the buildings,






rCjHCj = kL̄. (3.5)
Second, we have the summation of all residents is equal to the total population
∑
i
LRi = L̄. (3.6)
Third, the fact that agents are homogeneous when they choose where to live implies that


















Fourth, from agent’s problem (3.1), we know the share of the total rent in the total
expenditure is 1− β, thus we have
rRiHRi = (1− β) yiLRi. (3.8)
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Last, we have the total income













Firm Side First, the solution of firm’s problem imply that at the city level, we have
wj + rCj = pAj
and 
wj = pAj LEj < HCj
0 ≤ wj ≤ pAj LEj = HCj
wj = 0 LEj > HCj
(3.10)
where LEj is the total supply of effective units of labor and HCj is the total commercial
building at location j.
Second, LEj the total supply of effective units of labor is a summation of effective units













0 f (ak) dak represents the total productivity coming






probability density function of Frechet distribution with shape parameter θ, and LRi is
the total population living at location i. Here, lijLRi is the total productivity of agents
commuting from i to j. Here when θ > 1 (meaning the heterogeneity is large enough), lij is


































where Āi > 0, Kij > 0, and constant η are exogenously given, and Lwj = min (LEj, HCj)
represents the effective units of labor who actually work in location j. This formulation is
in line with Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) and Rossi-Hansberg (2005), the endogenous
interaction of agents with others implies that that there are external benefits to producers
from production done nearby.
Last, if the market determines the allocation of residential and commercial buildings, we
have for any j ∈ Θ
HRj +HCj = Hj (3.13)
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and 
rRj = rCj HRj, HCj > 0;
rRj < rCj HRj = 0;
rRj > rCj HCj = 0.
(3.14)
3.3 Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis
In this section, we define the market equilibrium and setup the zoning planner and present
the equilibrium and welfare analysis.
Definition 2. In a Market Equilibrium, all the resources are allocated through the
market. It is mathematically represented by real variables {HRj, HCj, Aj, LRj, LEj}i∈Θ, price
variables {rRj, rCj, wj, yj}i∈Θ, and {p, k, U} which are determined in equations (3.5)-(3.14).
Observe that in a market equilibrium, the total number of variables is 9N + 3. They
correspond to the 9N + 2 equations and a price normalization condition.
Definition 3. A Zoning Planner allocates the aggregate residential and commercial
buildings {HCi, HRi}i∈Θ and the rest allocation is completed through market. Particularly
equations (3.5)-(3.12) determine variables {Aj, LRj, LEj}i∈Θ, {rRj, rCj, wj, yj}i∈Θ, and {p, k, U}.
3.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
Now we state the existence result of the market equilibrium and zoning planner.
Proposition 1. i). The market equilibrium has a solution i.e. there exists {HRj, HCj, Aj, LRj, LEj}i∈Θ,
{rRj, rCj, wj, yj}i∈Θ, and {p, k, U} such that equations (3.5)-(3.14) hold.
109
ii). Given any zoning plan {HCi, HRi}i∈Θ satisfying
∑
iHCi > 0 and
∑
iHRi > 0, there
exists {Aj, LRj, LEj}i∈Θ, {rRj, rCj, wj, yj}i∈Θ, and {p, k, U} such that equations (3.5)-(3.12)
hold.
Proof. Here we explain the main ideas of the proof and leave details in the appendix. The
proof is based on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. There are two challenges in applying
the fixed point theorem. First, equations (3.7), (3.10) and(3.14) involve corner conditions
and therefore cannot directly serve as an operator used in Brouwer’s fixed point theorem;
second, some variables may go unbounded whereas Brouwer’s fixed point theorem require
the domain of variables to be compact. The two types of challenges are not new and have
been dealt in literature. Particularly, in order to prove the existence of equilibrium points in
non-cooperative game, Nash (1951) develops a technique to deal with the first challenge by
embedding the equilibrium equations in a dynamic system which can serve as an operator; the
literature of general equilibrium deal with the second challenge by considering the equilibrium
in a large bounded set (“box”) and then show that for a fixed point cannot be at the boundary
of the box. And the nature of our proof is to synthesize the two techniques and apply them
multiple times since in our model the two challenges show up in several places. 
This proposition illustrates that the characterization of the properties of the equilibrium
of urban models with spatial spillovers can be generalized beyond particular examples.
Theories that feature technological spillovers across space (see for example Fujita and Ogawa
(1982), Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2003), Rossi-Hansberg (2005), Fujita and Thisse (2013)
chapter 6) usually assume a particular geography (e.g. line or circle) and structure for
trade costs or impose a restriction on the spillover matrix Kij, and also typically assumed
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particular values for the spillover elasticity, η = 0 or η = 1. In contrast, Proposition 1 proves
that an equilibrium always exists for any η and for any matrix Kij governing technological
diffusion across space.
3.3.2 Welfare Analysis
Now we turn to compare the welfare difference between the market equilibrium and zoning
planner. Toward this end, we need to assign an objective function for the zoning planner to





HRj +HCj ≤ Hj. (3.16)
In below, we shall compare the expected utility of agents U under the market equilibrium
and zoning planner. However, it is difficult to directly compare. Therefore, we consider a
social planner as a benchmark who has a greater power than both the market equilibrium
and zoning planner. Formally, we have the below definition.
Definition 4. A Social Planner not only directly allocates the aggregate residential and
commercial buildings {HCi, HRi}i∈Θ but also determines all the rest allocations subject to
some constraints. Particularly, the social planner organizes the production, dictates LRi i.e.
how many agents live in location i, and allocates the goods and residential buildings to each
agent according to a linear rule, specifically, an agent gets qi + qijl units goods and hi + hijl
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units of residential housing if an agent commutes from i to j and can effectively work l hours.




subject to equations (3.6) and (3.16), the constraint that given the linear allocation rule,
agents maximizing utilities in determining their commuting choices (denote Ωi as the set of
agents choosing to live at location i and Ωij =
{



















qijtijaj (ω)µ (dω) ≤
∑
j
Aj min (LEj, HCj)




















Proposition 2. When η = 0, the solution(s) of both the zoning and social planners can be
implemented via the market equilibrium. Specifically, equations (3.5)-(3.14) have a solution
that also solves problems (3.17) and (3.15).
Proof. Details are in the appendix. 
When there are no spatial spillovers, Proposition 2 states that in our model, the market
equilibrium can reach the same goal of the zoning and social planners. It is related with but
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shall not be confused with the typical welfare theorems. The First Welfare Theorem cannot
be readily applied in our model because of our timing assumption and the fact that there
is no insurance markets (incomplete market). This result is more closed with the Second
Welfare Theorem but in our market equilibrium agents’ endowments are fixed, specifically,
they equally own all the buildings. This proposition ensures that compared with the market,
the difference of the zoning planner does not lie in redistribution but only efficiency.
When there are spatial spillovers, agents’ location choices have externality. While a
typical remedy to correct the externality is Pigou tax, in practice, Pigou tax may not
be a feasible policy tool e.g. a city planner may not be able to subsidize workers in one
neighborhood/block but not in another. We may need to consider other policy tools. Observe
that the allocation {HCi, HRi}i∈Θ of residential and commercial building can affect agent’s
commuting choices. Thus, the zoning policy may, to some extent, correct the externality.
Particularly, in equation 3.12, Lwj = min (LEj, HCj). If HCj is the binding variable, the
marginal increment of productivity in location i caused byHCj then is ηĀiKijL
η−1
wj . Aggregate
this effect across all location i and multiply with the price and inputs, we have its (partial
equilibrium) welfare effect1 as
rCj + κj




i ĀiKij min (LEi, HCi) . At the same time, the opportunity cost of
increasing one unit HCj is the benefit of increasing one unit HRj, which is measured by rRj.
Therefore, in practice, we can use rCj + κj − rRj to evaluate zoning policy at location j.
1. As shown in our proof, the nominal variables are directly linked with the objective function of welfare.
113
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of city. Despite the many spatial
linkages, the model allows for characterizing the existence of the spatial equilibrium of the city
even when the spillovers are much more general than what is usually considered in literature.
We consider a city planner whose different with the market does not lie in redistribution but
only efficiency. One shortcoming of this paper is that we are not able to provide a sharp
characterization of the optimal zoning policy when there are spatial spillovers. This reflects
a general difficulty in policy decision-making. Its mathematical nature is how to optimize
subject to a high-dimension fixed point problem.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Derivation of expected wage income and productivity
In this appendix, we derive the expression of expected income E [maxj∈Θwjaj (ω) tij] and
productivity lij.



























































































































θ exp (−x) dx
where in the last two steps we use two changes of variables: y = cijaj and x = y
−θ. Notice
that Gamma function is defined as Γ (t) =
∫∞
0

























































































3.5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part i).
The proof is based on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. We need to construct a suitable
operator.
First, consider the operator for HCi, HRi, Aj, and LRi.
H ′Ci =
HCi + max (0, Dri)Hj




HRi + max (0,−Dri)Hj
1 + max (0, Dri) + max (0,−Dri)
(3.19)








LRi + max (0, ERi) L̄
1 +
∑
i max (0, ERi)
(3.21)
where ERi = rRiHRi − (1− β) yiLRi is the excess supply on housing.




equation (3.11) may be ill-defined. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce an auxiliary
variable πij satisfying for any i
∑






















where wj = πwjpAj.
Third, consider rRj, rCj, and wj. They may potentially be zero and unbounded (non-
compact). To deal with this issue, again we introduce new auxiliary variables πRj satisfying,
which is used to represent rRi∑
i rRi
location j’s relative rent price, πwj and πCj satisfying for



















1−β comes from equation (3.7) thus this equation states that when welfare
is equalized, what the relative rent price should be.
We have the operator for πwj and πCj
π′Cj =
πRj + max (0, ELj)
1 + max (0, ELj) + max (0,−ELj)
(3.25)
π′wj =
πwj + max (0,−ELj)
1 + max (0, ELj) + max (0,−ELj)
(3.26)
where ELj = LEj −HCj is the excess labor in location i.
We can use them to construct rRj, rCj, and wj. Specifically,
r′Rj = rπRj (3.27)
r′Cj = pAjπCj (3.28)
w′j = pAjπwj (3.29)






, Ȳ = 1 is the normalized total GDP and r̄ > 0 is a large
constant and will be explained shortly.
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Last, we have the operator for yi, k, and p






















where p̄ > 0 is also a large constant and will be explained shortly together with r̄.
Let T : x→ x′ be equations (3.18)-(3.32) where x (and x′) represent all the endogenous
variables (except U which can simply be calculated according to equation (3.7)) and the
auxiliary variables {πij, πRj, πwj, πCj}i,j∈Θ. T has a fixed point because all the variables can
be constrained in a convex and compact domain, given r̄ and p̄.
Each equation of fixed point of T directly implies one of market equilibrium except that
in equations (3.27) and (3.32), r and p may be equal to r̄ and p̄, which are not part of the
market equilibrium. Now we show how to choose r̄ and p̄ such that for a fixed point of T , r
and p cannot be equal to r̄ and p̄.
First, we choose a large enough r̄ such that r = r̄ must imply max rCj < max rRj which is
against equations (3.18) and (3.19) of operator T . Assume r = r̄. Notice that since
∑
j πRj =






, r = r̄ implies (1−β)Ȳ∑
i πRiHRi
> r̄. A
very large r̄ implies that
∑
iHRi can be arbitrarily very small (in equation (3.24), a bounded




iAj min {LEj, HCj} must be lower bounded above 0 (notice that
for some j, LEj is lower bounded above 0). Therefore p = min
{
βȲ∑




upper bounded regardless the value of p̄. Thus max rCj ≤ max pAj is upper bounded.
Particularly, we can choose r̄ large enough such that max rCj <
r̄
N
. Therefore, we have
max rCj < max rRj.
Second, similarly, we choose a large enough p̄ such that p = p̄ must imply max rCj >
max rRj which is against equations (3.18) and (3.19) of operator T . Assume p = p̄. Therefore
βȲ∑
i Aj min{LEj ,HCj}
≥ p̄ furthermore, for any j, min {LEj, HCj} must be small enough. At the
same time, for some j, LEj is lower bounded above 0. Thus we have for some j, LEj −HCjis
lower bounded above 0. Thus πCj ≥ LEj−HCj1+LEj−HCj > c (equation (3.25)), for some constant
c > 0. At the same time, rCj = πRjpAj(equation (3.28)). Thus we can choose p̄ high enough
such that rCj > r̄ furthermore max rCj > Nr̄. At the same time rRj = πRir ≤ r̄. Thus we
have max rCj > max rRj, as desired.
In all, the fixed point of T directly implies the existence of the market equilibrium.
Part ii). Observe that compared with part i), here the only difference is that {HCj, HRj}
are taken as given. We can still use the same procedure as used in part i) except three
simplifications. First, we do not need equations (3.18) and (3.19) anymore. Second, we
only need to consider the residential rents in locations i where HRi > 0 and productions
in location j where HCj > 0. Third, denote the sets of the two type locations as ΘR and




and p′ = βȲ∑
j∈ΘC
Aj min{LEj ,HCj} , which are naturally upper
bounded. That is we do not have to construct auxiliary variables r̄ and p̄ anymore. 
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3.5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since η = 0, we can treat the productivity as exogenous. It is sufficient to show the
market equilibrium is equivalent with the social planner’s problem. We proceed by showing
the first order conditions of the social planner are equivalent with the market equilibrium
conditions. Toward this end, we first transform the social planner problem into a more
tractable form.





; otherwise, different agents
commute from i to j have different Marginal Rate of Substitution therefore there is room to
improve agents’ welfare (without changing agents locational choices). Thus, we assume one
qi = ciai, hi = cibi, qij = cijai, and hij = cijbi where ci, cij ≥ 0 and ai, bi > 0 satisfy
aβi b
1−β
i = 1 (3.33)
which represents one unit consumption bundle at location i. Thus given agent’ choice of
where to live, they just need to solve maxj∈Θ aj (ω) cijtij. Notice that this is the same







similarly as we do for the market equilibrium, we obtain agents’ average consumption














ai (ci + gWi)LRi ≤
∑
j
Aj min (LEj, HCj) , (3.35)
the residential building at location i
bi (ci + gWi)LRi ≤ HRi,









In addition, we have the welfare equalization condition
U = ui (ci + gWi) . (3.37)





subject to equations 3.33-3.37 and equations (3.6) and (3.16).
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Set up the Lagrange function



























Aj min (LEj, HCj)−
∑
i




























λPi (ui (ci + gWi)− U)
where {λEi, λWi, λri, λp, λrRi, λk, λwj, λPi}i,j∈Θ are the constraints’ corresponding Lagrange
multipliers.
Now we consider this Lagrange function’s first order conditions. Differentiate it with
respect to the Lagrange multipliers, we get the above constraints thus we do not reprint







λPi = 0, (3.38)
∂L
∂ci

































i − λp (ci + gWi)LRi = 0, (3.42)
2. Here, we do not consider the corner case here. For the corner case, the same procedure follows except




= λEi (β − 1) aβi b
−β
i − λrRi (ci + gWi)LRi = 0, (3.43)
∂L
∂HRi
= λrRi − λri = 0, (3.44)
∂L
∂HCi
= λpAjx− λri = 0, (3.45)
∂L
∂LRi











= λpAjy − λwj = 0 (3.47)
where x, y ∈ [0, 1] are used to represent the subgradients of min (LEj, HCj) with respect to
LEj and HCj.
In below, we show that the market equilibrium result satisfies the first order conditions
of the social planner problem. If we substitute the corresponding
{U, ci, cij,Wi, ai, bi, HRi, HCj, LRi, LEj}i,j∈Θ of the market equilibrium result, clearly equations
3.33-3.37 and equations (3.6) and (3.16) are satisfied. Thus we just need to check if we can
find corresponding Lagrange multipliers such that equations 3.38-3.47 hold.
We first construct the Lagrange multipliers with the help of use the market results.
Set λp = p the price of goods; λwj = wj the wage per efficient unit; λri = λrRi =
rRi the residential rent
3; λk = k capital income; λPi = β











LRi; λEi = yiLRi the total expenditure. Now we verify equations 3.38-3.47 one
by one. Equation 3.38 holds by setting the right nominal price p; Equation 3.39 because
it is exactly the budget constraint for people who consumes one unit consumption bundle;
3. Again, here we only consider the non-corner case; for the corner case, the first order conditions are in
the complementary-slackness form.
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LRi; Equation 3.41 holds
because it is a linear summation of equations 3.39 and 3.40; Equations 3.42 and 3.43 holds
because they are exactly the expenditure spent on goods and housing; Equations 3.42 and
3.43 holds because they are the rent equalization conditions; Equation 3.46 is the budget
constraint for an average consumer satisfied; Equation 3.47 is simply the wage equation.
Also, any solution of the social planner corresponds to a market equilibrium. Notice that
we can reversely use the same equations and Lagrange multipliers in the above paragraph
to construct the market results. 
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